


Military Intelligence

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1994
PB 34-94-4

Intelligence Support to the Logistician



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Writer of the Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce the Writer of the Quarter is Major Scott R. McMeen for his article, "Fire Support Doctrine: Sensor to Shooter."

Congratulations to Major McMeen, and thanks to all of our authors for their fine articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. It is your contribution that makes MIPB the professional forum for Military Intelligence.

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Military Intelligence

Professional Bulletin

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VANTAGE POINT



by Major General John F. Stewart, Jr.

A New MI Concept

The Intelligence Corps has undergone great change and transition over the past few years as our Branch and Corps embarked on a journey into the 21st century. We are leading into the future to shape our own destiny. In this issue, I will take a step back and review our Military Intelligence accomplishments over the past year or so.

The first and most important accomplishment of the year was intellectual. Over the past three years, we established the basis of our new MI Concept. This vision, put together last summer, received full support from our Army. It now drives doctrine, organization, modernization, and training. Our Corps has created the Military Intelligence vision for tomorrow, and we are a powerfully unified force. As with any military operation, if the commander's intent is known, then the brilliance, expertise, ingenuity, and courage of the American soldier will win the day.

We have made great progress toward this goal of universal understanding of future requirements. Officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers understand the new MI Model and they understand the role of intelligence in the information age. They can deliver intelligence to the commander on time, every time.

The Commander Drives Intelligence

Driving the change in our intellectual base is the fact that we now support a "Force Projection" Army. The cornerstone of the MI Concept in this Army of Force Projection is "The combat commander drives the intelligence effort" (FM 100-5, Operations). The commander cannot afford to operate without intelligence. It is our job, as MI professionals, to help train commanders on how to focus intelligence on their operation and how to synchronize it with their decisions.

Additionally, we must also ensure our systems and the personnel who operate them are integrated, vertically and horizontally, into the battle command team. We must understand commanders' needs and respond accordingly. We are close to the day when commanders can pull exactly what they need from the seamless intelligence structure anytime they need it.

Change must be comprehensive yet coordinated. As we write and develop doctrine, we must continue to seek input and feedback from the commanders and soldiers in the field in corps and divisions, and INSCOM and joint commands as well. To write manuals that the tactical units will believe in and fol-

low, we must stay close to the field to understand innovations and demands from the operational Army. More important, we must incorporate those innovations and changes into our doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). That is exactly what we did this year in publishing a series of new manuals like our capstone manual FM 34-1, **Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**. This manual spells out, in clear terms, the new MI doctrine. From FM 34-1 will flow specific doctrinal applications in a myriad of other MI areas. We are proud of FM 34-1 because it was written in complete coordination with you in the MI Corps and with combat commanders.

The Battle Laboratory: This need for close coordination and careful progress of doctrine was central to the forming of the Battle Command Battle Lab - Huachuca (BCBL-H). The BCBL-H leads our intellectual change as it examines and explores developments in doctrine, technology, and training. The decision to put a Battle Lab at Fort Huachuca, dedicated to improving intelligence and integrating operations and placing intelligence in the center of the combat commander's world, shows the respect and importance that the Army's leadership places on MI. The domination of information will largely determine future battles.

Training

We effected changes in training this year, with the closure of the Intelligence School at Fort Devens, and courses moving to Fort Huachuca. Additionally, we continued to institute the changes identified in last year's Force Design Update and the 1991 MI Relook to train the MI Force on intelligence in force projection. We developed new courses for 96Us (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator) and reserve component 97Ls (Translator/Interpreter). Military Intelligence can fill the critical need for a pool of Reserve linguists ready to accept multiple languages, and to provide worldwide language coverage (never really achievable by the Active Duty Force), based on 97L courses. An all-military staff will soon teach the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle course; the course was transferred from the contractor. It will serve to fill the Army with the skills needed to maximize this great commander's tool to see the battlefield more closely.

Officer Training Battalion. We focused the 111th MI Brigade mission more sharply on training and operations. To do that, we recently formed the Officer Training Battalion under the brigade. This battalion consolidates all officer training under the

auspices of one commander and will do much to streamline and improve the management and development of officer courses taught at Fort Huachuca. Those in command teach. They start with morning PT and stay with their officers throughout the day.

Integrated Field Training Exercise (IFTX). The key to success in the tactical/technical world of MI is to train in a realistic environment. The emergence of new technology with tremendous capability has made it essential that we train soldiers and officers as a team in the field. The IFTX has done this.

Since early 1993, we have seen this exciting field training exercise improve and grow into a full-scale operation involving hundreds of soldiers of different MOSs and ranks, doing the jobs they will actually do in their units. The IFTX simulates actions intrinsic to battalion-, brigade-, division-, and corps-level human, imagery, and signals intelligence. It brings together students of all the varied courses taught here and forms them into integrated teams to train and fight the intelligence battlefield operating system.

New Systems. This year also saw a movement forward in the capabilities of field units. New technology made it to the field ahead of schedule and at a quick pace. The XVIII Airborne Corps, 82d Airborne Division, and V Corps (all of its divisions) received the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). I Corps helped develop the ASAS-Extended program to provide ASAS interconnectivity with all corps and divisions by Christmas 1995. We fielded the Joint-STARS ground station module to XVIII Airborne Corps and will field the short-range UAV soon in III Corps. GUARDRAIL Common Sensor is on its way

to the XVIII Airborne Corps. TROJAN SPIRIT arrived at several corps. INSCOM continued to modernize its brigades worldwide.

The Future

We tested all this new doctrine and technology in a series of field training exercises, command post exercises, and simulation exercises, the most important of which was Operation Desert Capture II (featured in the July-September 1994 MIPB). This operation at the National Training Center gave our branch a clear picture of where we are going and what lays ahead—both successes and challenges.

We must look to the future and can continue our great progress only if we continue to focus on the future. In the next year and beyond, we will concentrate on bringing the intelligence vision to all the commanders and leaders in the Army. We want to focus on the short-sword fighter, ensuring that our system of systems is finely tuned, synchronized, focused, and fused so that the intelligence is there every time, on time.

If we focus on the combat commander, and on training ourselves as better intelligence professionals, we can keep intelligence at the forefront of change in our Army. The information age demands it, and as I visit units and look at soldiers, I know we are up to the task. It has been a great year. Yesterday's legacy is a powerful driving force toward tomorrow's vision, and we have lived that legacy and that vision throughout the last year. **ALWAYS OUT FRONT!**

by Command Sergeant Major Robert T. Hall and Sergeant First Class Mike Fallon

The information age brings special challenges for our Army. The Army will continue to field new doctrine and equipment designed to exploit new technologies. As a result, the NCO corps must develop a diversified training system. In the future many of our tasks and the conditions will change. However, the standards cannot and will not change.

The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is our premier system. Past experience shows that most MI soldiers will, at sometime in their career, use ASAS. The Army will give NCOs who work with ASAS greater responsibility because of the increased capability of ASAS. Therefore, ASAS increases the training challenge for all of us, both here at the Intelligence Center and in the field.

Once NCOs conquer the training challenge and master the advanced skills, they must maintain those skills. We can fully develop the system's capability after initial training so that ASAS's most complex features become routine. This is a major goal of the leaders here at the Intelligence Center.

ASAS, a "crew-served weapon," requires our NCOs to develop a better understanding of the intel-

ligence system. The Army will measure the success of NCOs by their basic analytical skills and their ability to direct and conduct operations in a digital environment. NCOs must identify, comprehend, and react appropriately to the mass of data that ASAS compiles. Senior NCOs must know how to perform advanced data base management. The best NCOs will also know how to exploit these systems to support the all-source intelligence process.


Training remains our number one job. We must develop a dynamic, comprehensive, hands-on program that shows confidence in our soldiers and equipment. We must participate in all phases of training.

However, like all new systems, ASAS has limitations. But its capabilities will allow us to stand on solid ground in the information age.

Regardless of technology, our greatest asset—our soldiers—will continue to set the standard. Together, with our soldiers, we will continue to dramatically improve their skills. **ALWAYS OUT FRONT!**

SFC Fallon is the chief intelligence NCO for ASAS.

FROM THE EDITOR



Recently I had the privilege to observe a brigade rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). I observed the rotation as part of an initiative implemented by the Intelligence Center. This initiative is important to intelligence because it—

- ☐ Improves the close relationship between the Intelligence Center and the NTC.
- ☐ Augments the professional development of Intelligence Center officers and NCOs.
- ☐ Allows Intelligence Center personnel to assess the general proficiency of tactical units.
- ☐ Provides Intelligence Center personnel feedback on how to improve the effectiveness of the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS) through training, doctrine, or other means.

During the rotation, I spent most of my time with the brigade S2 observer-controller (OC) team and the MI company OC team. I was extremely impressed with the OCs and the rotation. The OCs did an outstanding job evaluating and coaching the participating unit. However, the most impressive OC skill was a thorough understanding of all of the BOSs. During the after-action review process, the OCs carefully linked planning and execution deficiencies by BOS to actual effects during the mission.

I made several observations during the rotation that are my personal opinion. The outcome of each mission and some OC comments seemed to support my observations. These observations are generalizations and are not necessarily valid for every unit.

1. Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)/Counterreconnaissance. The doctrinal principles and emphasis at the NTC support a synchronized, robust R&S/counterreconnaissance effort. However, friendly forces usually lose this battle. This is a command issue and we must stress it at Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and Fort Sill. Commanders should dedicate a tank or Bradley platoon, if necessary, to help the scouts penetrate an enemy counterreconnaissance screen (especially in the desert). Commanders and S3s must apply innovative operational techniques to succeed.

2. G2/Brigade S2 Training. It appears that there is inadequate intelligence training support from the division G2 to the brigade S2, and the brigade S2 to the battalion S2. Intelligence leaders must adequately train and maintain their personnel at the tactical level so that intelligence can deliver on the promise of seamless intelligence support to the warfighter.

3. Intelligence Staffing. It is critical to fill maneuver battalion and brigade S2 sections with senior, experienced MI personnel of all ranks. The S2 section is greatly handicapped if its members have less seniority and experience than other sections, especially the S3 section.

4. BOS Integration. Intelligence Center training and doctrine adequately address intelligence preparation of the battlefield. However, I believe we must still improve both our doctrine and training on the complicated process of BOS integration. Doctrine must clearly define and illustrate this process for tactical units.

Following the incredible success of Operation Desert Capture II, MI will ensure that tactical intelligence meets all of the commander's requirements. There are some old and new doctrine, training, leadership, organization, materiel, and soldier issues that I'm sure MI will solve within tactical intelligence to successfully support the warfighter.

Stephen B Leader

LETTERS

To the Editor

In response to SFC Henry G. Johnson's comments (July-September 1994) regarding my article, "Korea, A Time for Vigilance," I offer the following.

A careful reading of my article should make it clear that SFC Johnson and I agree on a number of his points. North Korea poses a significant military threat to ROK and U.S. soldiers. SFC Johnson is correct; technically, a state of

war still exists and an uneasy peace is maintained only by an armistice agreement.

However, there are some points upon which we apparently disagree. SFC Johnson offers no evi-

(Continued on page 54)

Intelligence Support to the Logistician in Somalia

by Captain David L. Brand,
Sergeant Paul J. Bryson, and
Specialist Alfredo Lopez, Jr.

"If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." With a one-word substitution, Sun Tzu's famous quote could apply to non-maneuver as well as to maneuver units. Replace "battles" with "convoys" and the necessity for intelligence in logistical units becomes apparent.

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and published doctrine provide some guidance to intelligence officers assigned to support non-maneuver units. However, in an attempt to bridge the gaps, the Support Group S2 must often apply maneuver unit doctrine to his or her special situations.


This article examines intelligence support to a brigade-size Corps Support Command (COSCOM) unit deployed in a combat environment. The material is organized using the five phases of the intelligence cycle:

- ☐ Plan and direct.
- ☐ Collect.
- ☐ Process.
- ☐ Produce.
- ☐ Disseminate.

Plan and Direct

The mission of the U.N. Forces Somalia (UNOSOM II) was to conduct military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment in which humanitarian and economic aid and political reconciliation could occur.

On 18 August 1993, the 507th Corps Support Group (CSG) (Airborne) deployed to Somalia. The 507th CSG (ABN) is organic to the 1st COSCOM, XVIII Airborne



Corps. It was the support group for the U.N. Logistic Support Command (UNLSC). A U.S. brigadier general, assisted by a skeleton staff, commanded the UNLSC. Together, they provided command, control, and management of theater-level logistics for UNOSOM II Forces, which de-

ployed in support of U.N. Resolution 814. The 507th CSG (ABN), or Task Force 507, supplied personnel, equipment, and leadership to accomplish the mission.

Doctrinally, the 507th CSG (ABN) fights the rear battle. In Somalia, we fought the rear battle mission within the main battle

Photo provided by Cpt David Brand



Intelligence reports were packaged based on the consumer—the logistician.

area. This required a detailed plan, analysis, and flexibility from the intelligence personnel and logisticians who defended bases in or near an enemy stronghold.

Identifying the enemy was an enormous task. In the strictest military sense, General Aideed's Somali National Alliance was the enemy. However, on a day-to-day basis, the threat ranged from infiltrators and looters to drive-by shooters and nightly random mortar attacks. We examined the entire threat spectrum to identify the intelligence mission and to recommend intelligence requirements to the commander. Simply stated, the S2 mission was to identify the threat to UNOSOM II fixed sites and convoys.

The 507th CSG provided logistic support to 26 Coalition nations situated along nine main supply routes (MSRs) spread across a country only slightly smaller than Texas. One of the most challenging aspects of the operation was intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Effective organization and the full use of all assets were essential in producing the IPB products necessary to identify and counter the threat.

After our commander issued guidance, we identified enemy courses of action (COAs) and analyzed friendly COAs from the enemy perspective. We referenced FM 34-3, *Intelligence Analysis*, and FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*.

Every friendly COA required the group commander to move convoys in and around the city of Mogadishu and large areas throughout Somalia. Additionally, every COA exposed soldiers to land mines, rocket propelled grenade attacks, mass attacks by looters, or attacks by hundreds of heavily armed militia.

Based on the commander's guidance, we recommended two priority intelligence requirements.

- ☐ What is the threat to UNOSOM II fixed sites?
- ☐ What is the threat to 507th CSG (ABN) convoys?

Collect

Our next step was to develop named areas of interest, event templates, and event analysis matrices to confirm or deny each enemy COA. These products became the basis of our collection plan, as stated in FM 34-8, *Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence*.

Non-maneuver units are often seen only as intelligence consumers and not collectors. To overcome this perception, we developed a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan to support our collection effort.

Using FM 34-2-1, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance*, we were able to adapt the R&S plan to our situation and mission. We identified the intelligence collection assets in the task force by brainstorming and thoroughly reviewing the 507th task organization. (See Figure 1.)

Internal assets. Truck drivers, engineers, and MPs were our greatest internal collection assets. They were often the only in-country assets that could provide timely and accurate information.

All convoy commanders completed a post-convoy debriefing report no later than four hours after the mission. They provided updates on road conditions, attitudes of the people, inter-clan fighting, bandits, and obstacles.

We processed and disseminated this information as quickly as

possible; thus providing the next convoy updated threat and road conditions.

External assets. The Central Command (CENTCOM) Intelligence Support Element (CISE) provided access to theater level intelligence assets. This greatly assisted our collection effort and the IPB process. Through daily

13th Corps Support Battalion (CSB)
Convoys can report road conditions and Somali attitude inside and outside the city.

561st CSB
Convoys can report road conditions and Somali attitude inside and outside the city.

TF 11th Signal
Remote sites can send timely reports on activity outside Mogadishu.

TF 24th Transportation (Port)
Soldiers interface with Somali port workers and provide valuable information.

362d Engineer
Soldiers provide information on natural and constructed terrain features and analyze obstacles.

977th Military Police
Soldiers provide constant up-to-date information on road network and the Somali attitude within the city.

GSR Ph/312th Military Intelligence Bn
Soldiers monitor NAI, and detect enemy movement during hours of limited visibility.

Tunisian Security Co
Soldiers conduct constant surveillance of university compound perimeter.

Civil Affairs/G5
Soldiers maintain a positive interface with the population throughout Somalia and provide valuable information.

Figure 1. Collection assets.

and sometimes hourly interface with the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) in the CISE, we exchanged ideas and information and attempted to reduce redundancy in the intelligence collection effort.

Challenges to the collection effort. The problems with intelligence collection in this environment are—

- ☐ No clear direction or focus.
- ☐ Minimal intelligence interoperability.
- ☐ A constantly changing threat.

1. One of the greatest detractors to the intelligence collection effort was the lack of clear direction and coordination. Although the United Nations had its own U-2 and intelligence staff, cross-talk between intelligence agencies of Coalition nations was minimal. These forces were responsible for the security of the towns and villages through which our convoys passed. The coordination of intelligence assets and the exchange of information would have proved useful.



Threat situation board of Mogadishu.


2. To overcome the minimal intelligence interoperability problem, we developed classification guidance and distributed intelligence based on the situation. If we fight alongside Coalition nations, we must share intelligence. If necessary, intelligence should be sanitized, but it must not be

neutralized.

Even among U.S. Forces, intelligence sharing can improve. Duplication of effort and the misuse of collection assets were common. The lack of coordination and direction was directly attributable to the absence of a UNLSC G2.


3. The threat from hostile forces was ever-changing. Although threat assessments and summaries were abundant after the fact, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict the enemy's next move.

In an environment such as Somalia, where the enemy is indistinct and the mission unclear, predictive intelligence will remain elusive. However, coordination of U.S. and Coalition intelligence collection assets must focus on clearly defined collection requirements. This will increase our ability to provide predictive rather than just historical intelligence data.



Process

The intelligence data base is the foundation for complete and accurate analysis. Using a data base program, we compiled every spot report, threat assessment, and intelligence report we received into a retrievable file. We used this data base as a basis for predictive intelligence, to confirm or deny enemy COAs, and to



cross-reference reports to determine credibility.

Using a data base system, connections between personalities, locations, events, and weapon systems were easily made.

Produce

A useful product derived from the data base was a "snapshot" threat assessment. These one-page assessments highlighted the threat to fixed sites, MSRs, and local routes. We used this timely intelligence to enhance or change the focus of our force protection effort. For example, the mine threat assessment provided a quick summary to convoys by type, location, and employment tactics. The assessment also ranked routes based on the likelihood of a mine threat.

The commander used these facts when he chose routes and planned convoy security. IPB of the 1,000-plus miles of supply routes was a continuous process demanding much of our time and resources. Detailed analysis resulted in the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), situation templates, incident overlays, and other IPB products.

Our most important product was the MSR Threat Packet. It was a combination of information and intelligence from several

sources including engineer assessments, map reconnaissance, and on-the-ground terrain analysis. This product was based on the OCOKA factors: observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach.

The 96B Intelligence Analysts accompanied convoys along the MSRs to get a firsthand look at the terrain and, in some cases, the threat. Equipped with maps, tape recorders, and notebooks, they performed detailed, accurate analysis of supply routes. Although time-consuming and people-intensive, we felt that our six-month mission merited this level of analysis. The MSR packet was a living document updated with current engineer assessments and intelligence derived from the post-convoy debriefing format.

Disseminate

We must ensure anyone reading an intelligence report can understand it. With this in mind, we "packaged" our intelligence reports based on our customer—the logistician. We used various methods of dissemination, ranging from one-line threat warnings distributed by telephone, electronic mail, and courier to detailed intelligence estimates, overlays, and assessments. The graphic intelligence report and the one-page "snapshot" worked best for

quick threat updates. These products provided a simple bottom-line-up-front assessment.

To be effective, intelligence reports must be event driven, not based on time periods. This held true in Somalia. Supply convoys moved to various places at different times. For a useful threat assessment, we had to disseminate it on a timely basis. Similar to the doctrinal principle that you never hold intelligence assets in reserve, we never withheld intelligence, no matter how raw, based on standard reporting times. We disseminated all intelligence along with an explanation of its reliability and accuracy.

Conclusion

Logistical units are usually the last to get intelligence assets, personnel, and support. This fact, coupled with the lack of a clearly defined threat, further complicates intelligence collection and production in non-maneuver units.

We must write clear and specific doctrine to support the non-maneuver intelligence officer.

With continued deployments in operations other than war, the need for quality intelligence in all units, regardless of mission, is imperative. All Army units must not only consume intelligence but they must also collect and produce intelligence in the ongoing effort to fill gaps in the intelligence picture.

CPT Brand is S2, 507th CSG (ABN) at Fort Bragg, NC. He has also served as operations officer with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps G2 and an Armor officer in the 3d Armor Division.

SGT Bryson is the NCOIC of the S2 Section of the 507th CSG. A former infantryman, SGT Bryson served with the Old Guard in Washington, D.C.

SPC Lopez is an intelligence analyst with the 507th CSG. In addition to assignments at Fort Bragg, SPC Lopez served with 1-72 Armor Battalion in Korea.

by Andre McGuire

The views, opinions, and information contained in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent official CIA, DOD, Army, or Intelligence Center policy or opinion.

You ought to know that intelligence is the most powerful means to undertake brave designs, and to avoid great ruins; and it is the chiefest foundation upon which all generals do ground their actions.

—General George Monk,
Observations Upon Military and Political Affairs (1671)

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is unique within the U.S. intelligence community because it is an autonomous organization, rather than a staff element of another government department. Furthermore, it is involved in covert operations.

The press has recently focused on U.S. intelligence activities because of the end of the Cold War, the Ames case, and a new administration at the CIA. Newspapers carry front-page stories about intelligence activities that affect future policymakers and military leaders. Much of the coverage is derogatory. Despite this, I am convinced that the CIA is essential to our national military strategy.

Movies, television, novels, newspapers, books by journalists, congressional inquiries, exposés by former analysts, and essays by "specialists" (without intelligence experience or an understanding of its role) shape the

public's perception of the CIA. The CIA's role in U.S. national military strategy has fluctuated between its prominent position during East-West tensions to its seemingly relative unimportance after the Cold War ended.

Our future policymakers and military leaders have a contradictory image of the CIA and an incomplete understanding of its real role in national military strategy. Our future leaders lack an adequate appreciation for the CIA's capabilities and limitations. Because of this, the military does not exploit a vast amount of intelligence data the CIA provides. This article is intended to clear

away some of the myths surrounding this agency.

Setting the Record Straight

There are five myths that many military personnel believe. I will attempt to dispel those here.

1. The CIA is not a collection of mistake-prone bunglers.

One often hears that the CIA makes a lot of mistakes and doesn't have a firm grasp on world events. Clearly, the support that combat commanders received from the national intelligence community during Desert Storm was a problem. Some of these intelligence organizations appeared unfamiliar with or unresponsive to the intelligence needs of wartime commanders.

However, the CIA's role in the Gulf War was unique and instructive.¹ Individual CIA analysts contacted their counterparts in theater and provided useful intelligence to Desert Storm planners. However, the CIA as a whole adopted a hands-off policy and did not actively support combat commanders.

Some policymakers and military leaders contend the invasion of Kuwait surprised the CIA. They view these incidents as intelligence failures. Nevertheless, there are more successes than failures. John L. Helgerson, Deputy Director for Intelligence, listed some successes in the *Wall Street Journal*. The CIA either anticipated or warned of—

- ☐ The rise of Yeltsin as a competitor to Gorbachev.
- ☐ The coup attempt against Gorbachev.

CIA Myth and Reality

- ☐ The Chinese Communist military crackdown, well in advance of the Tiananmen Square incident.
- ☐ Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent effects of that conflict on the Iraqi military (contrary to what military leaders say).
- ☐ The Yugoslavian conflict and the breakup of Czechoslovakia.
- ☐ Libya's construction of a poison gas facility near the city of Rabta in 1990.
- ☐ China's consideration of the sale of chemicals to Libya.
- ☐ Iraq's use of SCUD missiles against Israel as well as Iraq's destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells.
- ☐ Iraq's development of a chemical warfare capability.


The intelligence community can make a strong case for the CIA's value in shaping national military strategy, even using timeliness and accuracy of predictions as the sole standards of accountability. However, prediction is not a plausible standard for accountability.

2. Valuable intelligence is not always disseminated quickly to those with the greatest need and immediately used to its greatest effect.

People assume policymakers and the military automatically use intelligence the CIA provides. However, policymakers and the military do not always use or disseminate intelligence to the organizations that need it most.²

One of the ways the CIA assists policymakers and the military is through indications and warnings. However, the CIA does not decide how to respond to a crisis. The CIA also tries to give policymakers and the military basic information about developments throughout the world. This information includes facts and figures about every country in the world. The CIA—

- ☐ Surveys the infrastructure of a



country and assesses the personalities of current and potential leaders.

- ☐ Investigates scientific and technical developments.
- ☐ Strives to create an encyclopedic data base for reference.

These studies enable CIA analysts to become experts on a wide range of topics.

The National Intelligence Estimate is one of the most valuable products the CIA disseminates to policymakers and national military leaders. The estimate helps analysts predict the most likely outcome of future events. The CIA tries to outline alternative scenarios or possibilities for the future.

The CIA also provides essentially raw (unevaluated) intelligence directly from the source. Given these estimates, policymakers and the military must construct foreign policy or a national

military strategy to address the alternative scenarios.

For example, when it appeared that Iraq might invade Kuwait, the CIA told policymakers and the military that such an invasion was plausible.³ This information enabled the administration to assess the likelihood of an Iraqi invasion. A strategy based on the CIA's input should have been prepared. However, the military failed to develop a strategy and Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Policymakers and the military often look for intelligence that supports their bias; but the CIA cannot always confirm their view. Many policymakers and military leaders come to Washington with their own biases. When intelligence fails to support their personal assumptions, they are often angry, defensive, or uncomfortable. They often blame the CIA and turn to journalists, consultants, or academia.

Part of the problem is the un-

certain nature of intelligence. Intelligence involves the speculative evaluation of ambiguous data. Occasionally the CIA couches its reports in vague terms. This can occur when all the data may not be available and/or the CIA is trying to convey its level of uncertainty about the issue. Therefore, the CIA will assess an event as likely or probable, as opposed to definite. Policymakers and military leaders are understandably uncomfortable with vague assessments.

Policymakers and military leaders value intelligence on the basis of its brevity, timeliness, and relevance—in that order. The CIA tends to value intelligence in the reverse order—its relevance, timeliness, and brevity. Thus, the CIA must carefully “package” intelligence fast enough for a busy senior official or military commander. The CIA includes a summary of each of its research papers so that the message is readily understood. Therefore, senior policymakers or military leaders don't have to plow through a 20-page paper.

3. Modern technology has not rendered traditional intelligence methods obsolete.

Has technology replaced traditional espionage methods? Do we need more agents or more machines? During the tenure of Admiral Stansfield Turner as CIA director (1977-1981), he cut back on the agency's overseas personnel. The CIA soon learned that his action was a mistake. In fact, the rebuilding of our overseas strength began under Turner and continues today.

The CIA is home to the National Intelligence Tasking Center, managed by the Deputy Director for Operations. For the first time in U.S. intelligence history, the intelligence community formed an integrated, interagency mechanism to task human intelligence (HUMINT) requirements.

This center tasks the appropriate agency based on its chance of success, cost, and risk. DOD and State Department Bureau of

Intelligence and Research representatives participate in this process.

The CIA recognizes that technical collection systems can gather an enormous amount of data. But this raw data requires a tremendous processing capability and still leaves intelligence gaps. I think Turner would now admit that traditional methods of intelligence collection provide data that technical systems cannot provide. To gather intelligence effectively, the CIA needs a compendium of information from—

- ☐ Human sources.
- ☐ Open sources, to include translations of newspapers and magazines.
- ☐ Reports of overseas diplomats and attaches.
- ☐ Technical sensors.

4. Covert action is necessary.

In an ideal world, the United States should not have to use covert means to collect intelligence. But this is not an ideal world. Terrorists murder innocent people merely to attract world attention; drug dealers take advantage of human frailty; and adversaries of the United States spread false information, support terrorist groups, and attempt to harm the United States.

The United States must combat these activities without resorting to war. When the American Colonies revolted against England, the French helped finance the revolution through covert action. Every president since the beginning of World War II has consented to the use of covert intelligence-gathering operations. I suspect future presidents will do the same.

The CIA was established in 1947. It was designed to collect and evaluate information and to carry out other activities directed by the president and the National Security Council. This mission gave the CIA responsibility for covert actions.

Some events over the past 40 years demonstrate that the government must carefully control covert actions. Since the Church Committee investigations of the

1970s, the president must issue written findings before he can order covert actions. The CIA must brief, on a timely basis, the House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees on the president's order.

5. The post-Cold War world is not necessarily safer than the bipolar Cold War world and the CIA is necessary to maintain national security.

Clearly, the nature of our adversaries is changing. But is it for the better? If the Russians can pull off a reform program, will they be easier to deal with? If Gadhafi passes from the world scene, will the threat of terrorism against the United States lessen? These are questions for which there are no easy answers. But clearly, the problems confronting the United States today will not go away. The United States faces a more complicated world, because the centers of world power continue to expand and diversify. Furthermore, hostility to the United States—and what it stands for—is increasing.

CIA assessments on democratic and economic reforms in various countries, particularly Russia, are critical. If anybody attempts another coup in Moscow, the CIA must warn U.S. policymakers and the military before it happens. If two East European nations are close to war, the CIA must warn U.S. leadership and the military before we are drawn into the conflict.

The CIA also provides warnings of the worst case scenario—a Russian nuclear or conventional surprise attack. Today this may seem unthinkable, but if far-right politicians gain power in Moscow, the potential for this type of conflict is conceivable again.

The world is full of problems, without easy solutions. Problems in South Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia are all complicated. U.S. application of money, diplomacy, or military force does not yield solutions. In effect, the CIA offers U.S. policymakers and the military their best opportunity

to comprehend the limits of U.S. power and influence.

However, the intelligence community must continue to maintain the ability, through the judicious use of intelligence resources, to monitor the world. The CIA must use increasingly clever and sophisticated methods to provide the information necessary to develop sound policy and national military strategy.

But the policies and national military strategies that emerge from this process ultimately reside with people. Our policies depend on the dedication, intelligence, and knowledge of the American people.

CIA analysis is oriented toward the future. Data collection and analysis of historical and current events improve the agency's ability to forecast events, assess their implications, and assist policymakers and the military.

For example, evaluations of certain countries' past investments in defense industrial activities have helped CIA analysts and the entire government understand future military order of battle, as weapons flow from their factories. Analysts can likewise predict future arms sales to other nations. This focus on the future marks the difference between CIA analysis and the historical emphasis of many academics.

The Future

The intelligence community is still planning additional integration of CIA intelligence into the military. However, this integration will not cure all the problems. On the contrary, the purpose is not to determine the potential and limitations of intelligence in political and military strategy. The military needs a "wide-angle lens" to capture the full range of possible contingencies. Intelligence is more important in the development of military strategy than ever before.

The CIA must actively participate in the development of national military strategy. Only the CIA can provide critical insights that are not available from the

Defense Intelligence Agency, diplomatic exchanges, or open sources. These insights give the military an advantage in responding to future contingencies. The CIA can provide accurate, timely information about conditions, motives, and actions of foreign powers. Military planners cannot afford to ignore or misjudge the application of this intelligence. Logic dictates that we must base our military strategy on accurate and timely intelligence.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will continue to threaten our national security. Weapons of mass destruction offer a horrifying prospect in the hands of an "irrational group" or terrorists.

In the next decade, over 20 nations will be able to produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, chemical and biological weapons are easier and cheaper to produce than nuclear weapons. Unlike fissionable material, which you can audit with some precision, a country can easily conceal chemical and biological agents.

The United States must develop new and unfamiliar forms of intelligence to support national military strategy for operations other than war. This intelligence must include detailed knowledge of the political, economic, and geographic topography of dozens of developing countries.

Long-term socio-economic assessments will help the military prepare for civil strife, the collapse of governments, and other events related to operations other than war. The lack of a coordinated diplomatic and military strategy and the military's experience in Somalia have highlighted the need for greater inclusion of intelligence in operations other than war.

Conclusion

By using intelligence wisely and by cooperating with the CIA, military strategists can anticipate the kinds of trends, or shocks, that could transform the global security environment over the course

of the next generation. Intelligence can influence military forces in the next century as the pace of scientific and technological progress continues to accelerate.

Misunderstandings about the CIA's role have generated controversies regarding its role in Operations Desert Shield/Storm and in shaping national military strategy. These controversies have surfaced broad questions about the proper relationship between the CIA and the military.

I believe important CIA-generated intelligence is at least partially ignored because of false impressions about the CIA.

It is time to dispel these myths. Instead, we should use a more professional, shared relationship when developing national military strategy.

Endnotes

1. In response to lessons learned during the Gulf War, the CIA has strengthened its bonds with the DOD to provide coordinated and timely intelligence support to U.S. military commanders in the field. Former CIA Director, Robert M. Gates, established the Office of Military Affairs on 5 March 1992. This decision was based on recommendations from the Military Support Task Force which identified measures to improve CIA support to military planning and operations.
2. The inability to reliably disseminate intelligence, particularly imagery, within the theater was one of the major intelligence failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. One aspect of the problem was the lack of interoperable hardware: out of 12 Secondary Imagery Dissemination units deployed in-theater, only 4 could communicate with one another. Often the component headquarters staff failed to pass available intelligence downward to air wings and ground units. Senior commanders don't always pass intelligence downward, from Washington.
3. DIA analysts contended that Iraq was conducting training exercises. The CIA alerted policymakers and the military as early as mid-July that Iraq appeared to be planning an attack.

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HUMINT AUTOMATION

NOT AN OXYMORON

by Captain Gregory Gonzales

U.S. soldiers captured an enemy major as they overran his command post. They didn't realize their prisoner knew of an enemy plan to strike deep into the U.S. corps rear area. Two days later, the captive was interrogated at the corps EPW holding area. Intimidated and weary, he described the upcoming operation in detail. The interrogators sent their report to the corps Analysis and Control Element (ACE) through the only means available—a tactical FAX.

The FAX operator at the ACE had received hundreds of FAXs and was trying to do several things at once when the report arrived. In the confusion, he didn't read the report and threw it into a hold file for someone to read later.

The lesson to be learned from this example is simple: human intelligence (HUMINT) reports that cannot be automated may never reach their intended audience—the commander.

This type of failure occurs all too often. Analysts often overlook reports which they must read due to the volume of reports a corps and division ACE receives.

A Unique Problem

Military leaders have long recognized that human reporting provides intelligence that no other source can provide. However, the Army has not successfully automated HUMINT, even though it is an integral part of the all-source intelligence picture.

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is ideally suited for automation and its reports currently parse into the correlated data base of the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS). Until the recent III Corps Warfighter Exercise at Fort Hood, HUMINT reports, usually lengthy and diverse, could not successfully parse into the ASAS correlated data base.

The mission of the 163d MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) during the III Corps Warfighter Exercise was twofold:

- ☐ To totally integrate counterintelligence (CI) into an all-source intelligence data base.
- ☐ To automate the HUMINT reporting process.

The Army had not accomplished either goal before.

The members of the Interrogation/CI Company, 163d MI Battalion (TE) populated the ASAS data base with interrogation and CI reports. The ACE then used them to complete the III Corps intelligence picture and to provide valuable intelligence during the Warfighter Exercise. III Corps started the process during Phantom Saber III, the ramp-up exercise.

Warfighter Ramp-up

During Phantom Saber III, our first step in automating HUMINT reports was to select a reporting format that would parse into ASAS. We chose the KSALUTE report. The K means that the report is automated. SALUTE stands for the standard format: size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment. The KSALUTE is an approved U.S. Message Text Format. (See Figure 1.)

The KSALUTE report provided a concise, structured format to transmit spot reports derived from interrogation and CI reports. The format is not without problems, but it did allow us to gain entry into the ASAS.

During Phantom Saber III, the only available communications was the UGC-144 Communications Terminal (1970s technology). We sent KSALUTE reports to the ASAS via Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE). This process created some interesting challenges.

All automated reports that enter the ASAS must first pass through the Communications Control Set (CCS). The CCS acts as a switchboard to route all different types of reports to the ASAS. During corps-level operations, various units send thousands of reports through the CCS, causing

(Continued on page 49)

KSALUTE Message Format

```
EXER/(Exercise Nickname)//  
MSGID/SALUTE/(CDR 163 MIBN-IPW) / PW001//  
NARR/(Free Text)//  
KSALUTE/(Size)/(Activity)/(Location)/(Course)/  
  (Enemy Unit Designator)/(Date-Time Group)/  
  (Equipment)//  
RMKS/(Free Text)//  
DECL/OADR//
```

Figure 1.

The Linguist Paradigm

by Lieutenant Colonel
Richard F. Riccardelli

From intelligence skills, to liaison with coalition forces, to contract negotiations and law enforcement operations, linguists allow U.S. Forces to understand peoples and forces. All throughout World War II, the U.S. Government desperately needed Japanese translators, and during the Korean War the need for Korean linguists again far surpassed the supply. U.S. Forces faced the same problem again in the Middle East and Somalia because of a shortage of Arabic and Somali linguists.¹

Why do the DOD and the U.S. Army continually fail to develop an adequate pool of linguists? Can the current linguist system adequately meet our national strategic interests in a world where the "threat" is no longer bipolar? What management, legislative, and governmental programs would ensure that linguist availability meets military requirements and future national needs?

America's Linguist History: A 20th Century Tale of Neglect

The United States is a nation of immigrants. While America finds its strength in cultural diversity, the nation's history before World War II reflects an isolationist philosophy of "fortress" America protected by two oceans.

Nevertheless, America saw the need for foreign language proficiency. In 1913, 89 percent of 306 colleges and universities surveyed required a modern foreign language for admittance.²

However, this positive trend did not continue. Students taking high school German dropped from a pre-war high of 25 percent to less than 1 percent in 1929.³

From 1929 to the 1940s, Carnegie Corporation studies showed a drop in foreign language participation, accompanied by an academic emphasis on reading and writing foreign languages. The trend resulted in a generation of Americans unable to speak French, German, or Spanish.⁴ Americans disliked almost all things foreign.

World War II was America's "wake up call." Isolationism no longer served as a viable strategy in a world where military and economic alliances, technology, transportation, and information systems linked the interests of nation-states. Mirroring this reality, over 11,453,000 Americans served outside the United States from 1941 to 1945; during the Korean War, 3,700,000 served overseas.

Although America emerged from World War II as a superpower, modern language study in high schools dropped to only 13 percent by 1949. As high school standards fell, colleges followed suit. By the 1960s, 69 percent of colleges awarded degrees without a foreign language requirement.⁵

America has slightly reversed this trend over the past quarter century. Today, nearly 25 percent of pre-college students study a modern language. Still, the United States does not match the intensity of language study in other industrialized countries like Germany, France, Japan, and the former Soviet Union, where an estimated 10 million Russians read English. Conversely, only 10,000 Americans can read Russian.⁶

Today, 75 percent of American colleges award degrees without a foreign language requirement. Only eight percent of U.S. college students study a foreign lan-

guage.⁷

Fortunately, America remains a nation of immigrants. The 1990 census indicates that 20 million U.S. residents are foreign-born and 32 million Americans speak a language other than English.⁸

The Military and Federal Linguist Experience: Filling the Void

The U.S. military developed the first program for linguists just before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. While mobilizing the military and industry, the military identified an urgent need for Japanese linguists. Years earlier, when Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall served as a battalion commander in China, he taught and advocated foreign language training for his soldiers. No doubt, Marshall influenced the U.S. Army's emphasis on developing linguist programs.

In late 1941, the government established the Military Intelligence Service Language School at the Presidio of San Francisco to teach Japanese. The school trained only second-generation Japanese-Americans (Nisei) initially. A survey of 3,700 Japanese-Americans of military age showed that only 4 percent had a useful understanding of Japanese; and another 3 percent required considerable training. Few non-Asiatic Americans spoke or understood Japanese.

The school moved to Camp Savage in May 1942 and later to Fort Snelling, both sites were in Minnesota.⁹

In coordination with American colleges and universities, the Army developed a curriculum which emphasized speaking and listening through the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). The Army Japanese Lan-

guage School was established at the University of Michigan. Using ASTP techniques, American universities taught Annamese, Arabic, Bengali, Bulgarian, Burmese, Chinese, Czech, Dutch, Finnish, French, and other languages needed for the war effort.¹⁰

The teaching materials developed through ASTP became part of a major revolution in foreign language instruction. Through intense language training of six months to a year, the program produced linguists who could compete with graduates of six or more years of a language in academic institutions.¹¹

Other services and government agencies established similar programs. The Navy created the Navy Oriental Language Schools at Boulder, CO, and Stillwater, OK. The Navy used American college campuses to teach languages under the V-12 programs, an Army ASTP equivalent. Both services, in coordination with the Federal Government, started language and government schools at Charlottesville, VA, and Columbia University, New York City.¹²

In June 1946, the school at Fort Snelling moved to the Presidio of Monterey, CA, where the administration added Chinese and Korean language programs. In the early 1960s, the government combined the Navy and Air Force programs into a joint school called the Defense Language Institute (DLI). During the Vietnam War, the school trained more than 20,000 advisors and intelligence personnel in Vietnamese.

Today, DLI employs 900 instructors, teaches over 20 languages, and graduates 5,000 military and government linguists annually.¹³ An advanced school for Russian studies is based in Germany.

There are three other federal language schools. The State Department's Foreign Service Institute is in Alexandria, VA, with field offices in Tunis, Taiwan, Yokohama, and Seoul. It has an enrollment of 2,000 and provides instruction in 45 languages; the

State Department supplies 60 percent of the students. The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency run the other two schools.¹⁴

Legislation

Congress recognizes the national security value of linguistic education and training. Examples of language legislation include—

- The GI Bill education loan program after World War II.
- The National Defense Education Act of 1958.
- The Foreign Language for National Security Acts of 1984 and 1985.
- The National Security Education Program of 1991.

Senators Paul Simon and David Boren and former Congressman Leon Panetta are well-known congressional advocates of foreign language development.¹⁵

A 1984 Act authorized foreign linguist proficiency pay for military linguists. They receive pay based on their proficiency and language difficulty.¹⁶

The National Security Education Act of 1991 is known as "the Boren Bill," after Senator David Boren, then chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. It includes legislation that gives federal intelligence agencies a larger, more qualified pool of key regional and language experts. Through the program, DOD manages a trust fund of \$20 million to educate personnel in foreign cultures and languages.¹⁷


The Army Linguist Management Structure and Shortfalls

The Secretary of the Army is the DOD's executive agent for the Defense Foreign Language Program. Within the Army, the Director

of Training in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations manages the program. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is the Service Program Manager that identifies language requirements and reviews and assesses the overall program. The DCSINT also chairs the Army Language Program Review Committee to coordinate the Army effort.

Before the drawdown, 15,000 DOD positions required foreign language skill; the Army required 9,087 of these. The Intelligence Branch uses over half of the Army's requirements; the Army allocates the remainder to Special Forces, military police, and the adjutant general corps. In addition, the Reserve Component (RC) uses an additional 15,000 linguists.¹⁸

Finally, the Federal Interagency Language Roundtable coordinates training and academic standards. Roundtable participants include DOD, the Department of State, National Security Agency, U.S. Information Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Peace Corps, Voice of America, Department of



Commerce, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Library of Congress.¹⁹

In 1976, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel sponsored a study to determine why the Army had failed to develop and retain needed linguists. Many of the difficulties revealed in the 1976 study remain problems today. However, programs to use indigenous linguists succeeded in Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia.

Recently, the Army improved its system to identify and track linguists, but it still has not established a system to determine contingency linguist requirements.²⁰ The Army seldom fills units with multiple contingency requirements at 100 percent of their linguist authorizations. Additionally, over 50 percent of military linguists do not reenlist. The highest priority languages which are very difficult to learn (Arabic, Russian, Korean, Chinese-Mandarin, Persian-Farsi) are also the languages with the lowest reenlistment percentages.²¹

Many other issues cause shortfalls in sustaining soldier linguist skills, including—

- ☐ Poorly resourced non-resident training programs.
- ☐ A lack of emphasis in some units.
- ☐ Inadequate integration of foreign languages into exercises.
- ☐ War plans that fail to identify linguist requirements.

A promising program to provide linguists for contingencies uses RC soldiers. A linguist brigade in Utah is particularly noteworthy. Per capita, Utah is the most linguistically diverse region of the nation because of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints missionary program.²²

This brigade and those linguist units in Louisiana and Florida train and employ exclusively as

linguist translators. Assigned to companies by language, these linguists represent an invaluable contingency and mobilization pool.

Future Army and National Direction

A knowledge of foreign languages, obviously, has become an indispensable sidearm to the modern soldier, a weapon upon which not only his mission, but his life may very well depend.

—The Federal Government's Foreign Language Training Programs U.S. Senate Report, 1959



Today, U.S. foreign, economic, and military policies require a greater depth and diversity of linguists.

The Army should replicate the language training lessons it learned in World War II. Government should fund a training and national service partnership between the academic and business communities and government language schools. U.S. businesses would benefit from this pool with one of every three U.S. corporations owned or based abroad and

the increasing economic power of foreign markets. Incidentally, our society translates into English only 20 of 10,000 technical Japanese journals published each year.²³

There is a post-World War II precedent for this union. After the war, the Army established a fully staffed American university in Biarritz, France, to offer active duty soldiers college courses and linguist training.²⁴ Indeed, DOD has developed many quasi-academic and academic relationships for study and training. Rand, SRI International, Applied Physics Laboratory programs at John Hopkins University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology serve as examples of this marriage.²⁵

Next, in cooperation with colleges and universities, the government could use portions of selected military installations identified for closure as universities for language and area studies. Again, business, academia, and government should cooperate in this effort.

The use of high technology to provide interactive automation and video training and translation requires continued emphasis. The military has only used video teleconferencing, computer training, and linguist networking to a limited extent. In cooperation with the private sector, DOD and other government agencies should explore a national training and linguist sustainment system.

We need to establish regional RC units based on ethnic concentrations. Many large ethnic communities exist in our nation's cities. Capitalizing on these communities for national service recruitment would improve current and future mobilization requirements.

The key to organizational success is command emphasis on

Linguist Update

by Sam E. Delajoux

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) provides the following update to several points Lieutenant Colonel Riccardelli made in his article.

1. "Government should fund a training and national service partnership between academic and business communities and government language schools."

In 1992, the U.S. Government established the Center for the Advancement of Language Learning (CALL). This effort was part of a foreign language initiative to bolster the country's foreign language capabilities.

In a period of worldwide change and shrinking federal dollars, the government created CALL to ensure all federal agencies share critical language resources. One of CALL's most important missions is to strengthen the ties between government, the academic community, and business.

A standing committee, comprised of DOD and other government agency representatives, performs this mission through research and development. The committee meets regularly with the academic and business communities to share information and to foster mutual understanding of each agency's linguistic needs.

2. "The use of high technology to provide interactive automation, (and) video and translation requires continued emphasis."

Systems like Video Tele-Training (VTT), Satellite Communications for Learning (SCOLA), and computer learning software and hardware continue to enhance language training. Continued language research and expanded use of automation and artificial intelligence systems will lead to greater successes in the future.

3. "We need to establish regional RC units based on ethnic concentrations."

Currently, the Army is establishing more RC language units nationally. A main consideration is to locate these units close to concentrations of applicable ethnic groups. We anticipate these enclaves will provide a lucrative source of civilian-acquired foreign linguists. This initiative will prove to be a smart, cost-effective recruiting strategy.

4. "The key to organizational success is command emphasis on linguist readiness and proficiency."

AR 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (31 July 1993), requires commanders to report linguist proficiency levels as a criteria for acceptable unit readiness posture. Linguists must score at least 2-2 on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) to achieve the standard rating. As a result, units with linguists establish, sustain, and upgrade Command Language Programs.

Additionally, the revised AR 611-6, Army Linguist Management (projected for January 1995), establishes the 2-2 DLPT ratings as the minimum language proficiency levels for a linguist.

Mr. Delajoux is the OCMI language action officer.

linguist readiness and proficiency. Finally, the DOD linguist program requires increased support at DOD and interagency levels. The complexity of the economic, social, and military environment today requires a larger pool of linguists in all sectors of government and business.

Automation and artificial intelligence systems may provide some relief to our linguist needs. The investment we make today in developing citizen linguists will pay great dividends in peace and war in the 21st century.

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by Captain John E. Della-Giustina

In 1898, the Spanish-American War thrust the United States onto the international stage as a world power for the first time. As the United States concludes its first century as a global leader, the problems that confront us today are similar to those we encountered during our first decade in this position.

Our leaders have struggled with the question of how to pacify unstable foreign countries in which the United States has a national interest. We have deployed military forces in the Philippines, China, Panama, and Cuba in the 10 years after the end of the Spanish-American War. Recently, U.S. Forces deployed to Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, the Sinai, Rwanda, and Haiti.

Military Information Division Historical Background

An example that illustrates the

Intelligence in Peace Operations: The MID in Cuba, 1906-1909

importance of intelligence in peace operations was the Military Information Division (MID) during the second occupation of Cuba from 1906 to 1909. Of particular interest is the intelligence support the MID gave to the Army of Cuban Pacification (ACP). The MID experience in Cuba parallels present and future missions.

The history of the MID was short but significant before the first intervention in Cuba. Established in 1885, the MID was a small section of the adjutant general's office. Its primary functions were to—

- ☐ Collect information on foreign military forces.
- ☐ Control the Army attaché system.
- ☐ Compile maps and geographic studies.

From 1898 to 1902, the agency contributed to the Army's efforts first during the Spanish-American War and later during the Philippine Insurrection. In 1903, Secretary of War Elihu Root established the General Staff which consisted of three administrative divisions. The MID was the second division.¹ This demonstrated for the first time that the stature of intelligence had grown, and its function had become institutionalized at the highest Army level.

In April 1898, the U.S. Congress passed the Teller Amendment as a stipulation to declaring war on Spain. It stated that after the war, Cuba would receive its independence once it was pacified. In the December 1898 Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands to the United

States. These became national territories. At the same time, Spain gave Cuba to the United States but the Teller Amendment prevented the island from becoming American territory.

First Intervention

After the Spanish-American War, the United States maintained a unique relationship with Cuba. Its pacification and rebuilding, under the leadership of U.S. Army Brigadier General Leonard Wood, took three years. On 20 May 1902, Cuba was granted independence, and Tomas Estrada Palma became its first president.

However, before granting Cuba independence, the U.S. Congress once again exerted control over the island's destiny. It attached a provision to the independence agreement known as the Platt Amendment. The amendment permitted the United States to intervene in Cuba to preserve "a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty."² Cubans reluctantly made this part of their constitution.

In August 1906, political turmoil and revolt erupted in Cuba. On 29 September 1906, Estrada Palma and his weak government resigned because attempts to negotiate a settlement with the rebels had failed. This action left no one in charge of Cuban affairs. President Theodore Roosevelt, who had monitored the crisis for a month, immediately sent 5,000 U.S. Soldiers and Marines "to restore order" and "temporarily assume political control of the island."³ The U.S. Army played an

integral part in the administration's decision to intervene.

U.S. Army leadership realized that intelligence operations were essential if the military deployed to Cuba. Brigadier General Frederick Funston, a Medal of Honor winner during the Philippine campaign, knew the Cuban rebels from his service with the Cuban Army of Liberation before the Spanish-American War. He wrote to the Army Chief of Staff, Major General J. Franklin Bell, that the Cubans were highly mobile insurgents with good scouts and excellent information sources among the population.

Bell, also a veteran of the Philippines, emphasized the importance of intelligence in a pacification campaign in a letter to President Roosevelt at the end of August 1906. The letter stated that if the military was going to support Estrada Palma and quell the revolt, the Army should send personnel to collect information on the Cuban rebels. It further stated that the Army should establish a network capable of identifying "every individual secretly connected with the rebels' supply, information, and communication service."⁴ Bell then directed the General Staff to prepare a plan

for possible intervention in Cuba.

The MID was a key player in planning the Cuban operation. This was the first mission that would test the proficiency of the new General Staff. The official U.S. Army intelligence history states that the excellent planning by the second division (MID) and the third division (War College), "should have served to silence forever any lingering doubts about the desirability of a General Staff Corps being formed in the United States Army."⁵

The MID supplied information about the Cuban rebels, the populace, weather, and terrain, and provided maps. These formed the basis for a realistic plan for 18,000 soldiers to quell the revolt. Roosevelt approved the plan and Major General Bell's recommendation to send two officers to Cuba to collect information.⁶ The MID had planned well. It would now shift its focus from planning to on-the-ground operational intelligence support to those forces on the island.

Second Intervention

When the second intervention began, the MID immediately sent several officers to Cuba. In September 1906, nine MID officers

were in Washington; a month later, five of them deployed to Cuba. By 11 October 1906, Major David Gaillard and Captain John Furlong established the MID headquarters of the ACP in Marianao, just outside Havana. They were assisted by Captain Dwight Aultman, a Spanish linguist who the Army had stationed in Cuba during the first occupation after the Spanish-American War. He was also one of two officers Major General Bell sent to Cuba at the beginning of September 1906 to gather intelligence before the intervention.⁷

The MID soon built an effective political and tactical intelligence organization throughout Cuba. It divided the island into 26 sectors and placed an intelligence officer at each of the major Army detachments outside Havana. These officers reported directly to MID headquarters near the Cuban capital, except in one region. In the sugar-producing province of Santa Clara, a center of rebel sympathy, the 12 sectors passed information to a regional MID office headed by Major William D. Beach, who had served as the MID Chief in Washington from 1903 to 1906.⁸

Most of the intelligence officers in the outlying sectors were captains and first lieutenants detailed to the MID. Although they had little or no experience in MID matters, they performed their duties adequately. These officers provided information to skilled MID officers like Captain Furlong, who correlated it to accurately portray what was occurring in Cuba.

During the occupation, MID officers performed a variety of intelligence functions. Initially, their task was "to identify the insurgents, including their hiding places, sources of supply, and sympathizers in the civilian population."⁹ However, soon after the intervention began, the large U.S. Army presence and a joint American-Cuban Disarmament Commission virtually eliminated the possibility of a major conventional armed conflict with the insur-



gents. The MID's primary mission at that time was to collect information about the various Cuban political factions and special interest groups.

In their first year on the island, the MID also helped the Army's chief engineer create a detailed map of Cuba. Major General Bell considered a complete map of the

Intelligence from Cuba

During the second occupation of Cuba, the MID provided intelligence to the Army. Both the MID headquarters in Marianao and Major Beach's regional office sent reports to the ACP chief of staff. They also gave vital political intelligence to the American Provi-

ernor of current trends and conditions among the people. The MID released some of the best examples of these reports during its first several months on the island.¹²

On 2 November 1906, Furlong disseminated "Notes on Field Service in Cuba." This pamphlet analyzed the Army's approach to



Map 1. Major Railroads, Principal Cities, and Provinces, 1907

island necessary for the ACP to maintain order. MID officers often supervised infantry and cavalry units during terrain mapping operations in their sector. The final map was excellent and, according to reports, instrumental in deterring a Cuban armed insurrection.

The people observed the mapping operations and believed the U.S. Army knew the terrain as well as any Cuban did. Consequently, they believed the ACP and Cuban government could counter rebel activity anywhere on the island. In addition, MID officers continually forwarded reports of the "terrain, towns, and communication systems" in their area.¹⁰

sional Governor of Cuba.

The Cuban people were a primary source of information, and intelligence officers used them extensively. The MID spent as much as a thousand dollars a month on Cuban informants. For this purpose, the MID had an initial allocation of \$20,000 from the War Department's Emergency Fund created by the U.S. Congress in 1899.¹¹

Captain Furlong wrote numerous analyses of Cuba's political situation. His four years' experience in the Philippines and Cuba had prepared Captain Furlong for insurgent warfare and pacification efforts. He was able to apprise the Army and the provisional gov-

ernment based on previous U.S. programs in the Philippines and Cuba as well as Spain's experience in Cuba. Furlong believed there were three essential duties in counterinsurgency operations:

- ☐ Identify the insurgents.
- ☐ Prevent them from holding "popular support."
- ☐ Decimate them through vigorous, unrelenting offensive assaults.

Although intelligence was important in all three missions, Furlong believed identifying the insurgents was the most critical. To carry this out, he advocated that, "all field commanders have secret service funds available" for this

purpose.

When Captain Furlong interrogated captured rebels, he declared that they should keep prisoners awake for as long as it took to complete a thorough interrogation. The objective of these sessions was to find out as much biographical information as possible on other rebels.

Furlong also recommended that one officer serve as the "intelligence officer, provost marshal, and provost judge" for each Army section as the most effective way to centralize these operations.¹³ This emphasized the importance of close coordination between law enforcement and intelligence agencies in peace operations.

In December 1906, the MID wrote "an extensive biographical study" of influential politicians and rebel officers throughout Cuba. This study contained photographs of some of these men and accounts of their lives and political activities. In 1907, Captain Furlong provided analytical reports of Cuban political speeches, including a projection of the favored candidates in the yet unscheduled nationwide elections.¹⁴

One of the most important events the MID evaluated and reported was the Juan Masso Parra conspiracy. In late July 1907, Masso Parra, an exiled revolutionary, returned to Cuba and tried to stir up anti-American sentiment. He advocated that the local populace assault the U.S. Army and destroy "foreign-owned property." Several reports to Provisional Governor Magoon convinced him that a revolt was imminent. On 26 September 1907, he ordered Masso Parra and his confederates arrested. Due to Magoon's swift action any support for Masso Parra's violent ideas quickly dissipated.¹⁵

The MID also furnished information about another potential threat to the island's stability in 1907. Commanders and intelligence officers reported that non-Cuban businessmen planned to smuggle guns. To protect their interests from prolonged instability,

these plantation owners and merchants were allegedly attempting to instigate violence between the U.S. Army and Cubans to ultimately cause U.S. annexation of the island. Subsequent intelligence work proved most of these allegations false.¹⁶

Thus, in several instances, the MID had proven its worth. The MID had provided ACP headquarters and the Provisional Governor's office crucial indications and warnings (I&W) of possible threats. In the Masso Parra case, Magoon then took the necessary action and averted a possible rebellion. Masso Parra could have gravely damaged U.S. efforts to successfully pacify Cuba and return the government to the Cuban people.

End of the Intervention

On 7 December 1907, President Roosevelt, in his yearly speech to Congress, spoke about the ongoing intervention in Cuba. He praised the efforts of Americans working there, declared that elections would return the government to the Cubans, and that the United States would leave the island by 1 February 1909.

These pledges firmly established U.S. policy toward Cuba. Thereafter, the Provisional Government and the U.S. Army continued their duties and prepared for eventual withdrawal.¹⁷

In August 1908, the Cubans held both provincial and local elections, followed by national elections on 14 November 1908, without incident. Peace at the polls ensured a successful end to the second occupation. The Army used the MID to provide intelligence on the conditions in Cuba as late as November 1908. Major General Bell requested information on which Cuban politicians would most likely be pro-U.S. after the withdrawal, with the end of the occupation drawing near.

Two days after the national elections, Captain Furlong sent a memo to Bell detailing, "who were the best men or those most suited for being used by Americans."¹⁸

In January 1909, most of the American soldiers left the island and the last troops departed at the end of March. President Roosevelt and Cuban newspapers praised the U.S. Army for its fine efforts throughout its 30 months on the island.¹⁹

Aftermath

After doing an outstanding job in Cuba, MID officers returned to Washington in 1909 to find a very different General Staff. In 1908, the MID and the War College Division had moved to Washington Barracks, 20 miles from the Capitol. War College staff officers also convinced the Chief of Staff to subordinate the MID to the War College Division. MID officers protested both of these actions without success.

Apparently, the Army did not publicize the MID's contribution to the success in Cuba. As a result, intelligence throughout the Army suffered greatly for nearly a decade. (It was not until 1917 that Colonel Ralph Van Deman resurrected intelligence functions in the General Staff and the Army.)

In 1909, Van Deman, then a captain in charge of the MID's Map Section, saw many of his fellow MID officers leave intelligence duties or become instructors at the War College. However, in 1909, the MID published two works on its Cuban experience:

□ The first publication was a "sanitized" version of Captain Furlong's 1906 pamphlet, "Notes on Field Service in Cuba," called **Military Notes on Cuba, 1909**. Any reference to counterinsurgency operations and the activities of Cuba's politicians was deleted.

□ The second publication was **Road Notes, Cuba, 1909**.²⁰

Even with these two publications, the MID didn't capitalize on lessons learned during the Cuba years because the Army virtually disbanded the MID. Therefore, many of the lessons from that intervention were forgotten. The U.S. soon changed its focus to

European problems, and became involved in World War I.

Lessons Learned

Today's intelligence soldiers can benefit from the lessons learned by MID officers in Cuba. A look at MID experiences in Cuba re-emphasizes many of the principles found in current field manuals on operations other than war, to include—

- ☐ Acknowledge the primacy of human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.
- ☐ Make peace enforcement the first priority before implementing peacekeeping operations.
- ☐ Centralize intelligence.
- ☐ Use intelligence information and analysis to provide I&W to decision makers.
- ☐ Get HUMINT assets on the ground as soon as possible.

HUMINT is the primary source of intelligence in peacekeeping operations. The MID depended on HUMINT as the sole source of intelligence from 1906 to 1909 as do many peacekeepers today.

As the world grows more technically oriented, other sources have emerged that can provide good intelligence in peace operations. Nevertheless, none is as valuable as HUMINT. Our present MI force structure in those units most likely to conduct peace operations reflects this simple tenet.

In peace operations, intelligence and other assets must initially concentrate on peace enforcement. The Army, usually in joint or combined operations, must establish military security or an atmosphere of peace, before implementing a pacification plan. Therefore, it is necessary to neutralize (often by military force) potential insurgents or terrorists and separate them from their popular support. This is the first step in successful, comprehensive peace operations.

The MID's task was made easier because Cuban rebels welcomed a U.S. presence as long as Estrada Palma was not in power. In October 1906, most insurgent groups bowed to the de-

cisions of the joint American-Cuban Disarmament Committee. However, the MID continued to focus on possible rebel violence during its first months on the island. The MID compiled the information necessary to support any armed action against the rebels. This initial data later proved useful when the MID supplied intelligence on the political aspirations of many former rebels.

When the U.S. Army is tasked to control a large geographic area, it must establish a centralized intelligence infrastructure. In 1906, intelligence officers were not assigned to all battalion and higher staff levels in the ACP. However, the MID soon stationed an intelligence officer at each major garrison on the island. The Army set this precedent during MID operations late in the Philippine Insurrection.

The parallels between MID operations and those of the current intelligence apparatus are apparent. As in Cuba, local intelligence officers analyze information obtained in their own sector to provide intelligence to their commanders. Local intelligence is reported to the centralized intelligence office that monitors the overall situation and issues periodic analyses of events. The MID performed these tasks well and even set up a regional intelligence office to focus on the most vulnerable area.

The local and centralized office structure also provides the best way to disseminate I&W. Local intelligence officers must understand every aspect of their sector. This includes an understanding of the relationships between all threats, the society, the terrain, and other significant regional influences. Each sector is unique, and accurate I&W depends on a thorough understanding of the sector.

The centralized office uses the same methodology on a broader scale. It combines each of the local situations with regional, national, and perhaps international situations to analyze all threats

throughout the area of interest.

For example, the MID central office in Marianao warned the military and provisional governor of the Masso Parra and gun-smuggling episodes based on information from local and other sources.

Intelligence assets and personnel must be among the first to arrive in an area to conduct peace operations. The foundation for effective U.S. Army peace operations is the early deployment of local, centralized intelligence offices (initially focusing on peace enforcement operations). This tenet results in accurate I&W and intelligence support to the commander.

In October 1906, for the first time in U.S. Army history, intelligence soldiers and organizations were in the vanguard of a major military operation. MID officers were essential to the successful peace operations of the ACP from 1906 to 1909.

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TACSIM:

Intelligence Training for Tomorrow's Battlefield

by Major Gary Allen, PhD, and
Roger D. Smith

Tactical Simulation (TACSIM) provides interactive computer-based simulation to support intelligence training in MI battalions through echelons above corps units. TACSIM is used in exercises such as REFORGER, Central Fortress, Ulchi Focus Lens, Team Spirit, and Warfighter. These exercises occur in the United States, Germany, and Korea. In near-real-time mode, TACSIM trains all aspects of intelligence from the design of collection requirements to the analysis of raw intelligence. TACSIM models the tasking, collecting, and reporting functions of specific U.S. reconnaissance assets.

Characteristics

The model was originally developed as the Post Oak Simulator System in 1979 under the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). In 1980 it was renamed TACSIM. One of its first missions was to stimulate the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) with a realistic volume of intelli-

gence reports using the correct format. From a scripted scenario data base, TACSIM would operate intelligence missions against enemy forces and generate reports in U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF). TACSIM would then provide ASAS with reports at multiple classification levels forming the perceived picture of a conflict in progress.

TACSIM was able to stress intelligence analysts involved in training exercises, because of its standard format and realistic output. Before TACSIM was introduced into the training arena, human scripters replicated the performance of collection assets and wrote the appropriate reports to train analysts. Other intelligence simulations are available, but none contain validated sensor and platform models of the fidelity in TACSIM.

Another significant characteristic of TACSIM is its ability to produce standardized USMTF reports. This enables the model to transmit simulated intelligence directly into the same assets that process real-world intelligence. TACSIM reports can be proc-

essed without modification or manual intervention using the message parsers of systems such as—

- ☐ Warrior.
- ☐ Hawkeye.
- ☐ The Electronic Processing and Dissemination System.
- ☐ The Enhanced Tactical Users Terminal (ETUT).
- ☐ Constant Source.

In near-real-time mode, TACSIM trains all aspects of intelligence.

This concept translates into more realistic training through the use of systems the way they will be used in actual combat.

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, states: "Realistic training fosters awareness of the capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System in non-MI units while honing the skills of MI soldiers and organizations."

Equipment and Architecture

The TACSIM suite includes a standard Communication Support Processor (CSP). The CSP can transmit data to exercise participants at multiple security levels. This real-world communication connection enables the transmission of TACSIM reports across

time. This model provides a more realistic intelligence product. The goal is to eliminate the COMINT burden from human scripters for most training situations.

COMINT reports can describe superior/subordinate (in both directions), lateral echelon, and skip-echelon communications. The information in a report can include the location, activity, and identification of both the transmitting and receiving units.

A section of the report is available to record any conversational narrative. In the past, this narrative was selected from a library of scripted sentences and phrases. These narratives were grouped by type and activity of the unit intercepted. This provided only a minimum level of correlation between the scripted conversation and exercise events. TPO and the Army greatly improved and expanded this concept to provide a better correlation between COMINT and the exercise. The software is better informed than any human scripter could be, since the software can access a huge amount of simulation data.

Scripted conversations are now categorized according to various unit characteristics. It is possible to generate detailed narratives to use only under specific conditions. These characteristics include type, echelon, and activity of the detected unit. In addition, scripted conversations can focus on the amount of time the unit has conducted its current activity. This results in narrative reports that correspond to the doctrinal operations a unit performs (for example, establishing defensive positions, going on the offensive, or beginning to convoy).

TPO and the participating unit must create the narrative library before the exercise and may use it for multiple exercises. Therefore, it is impossible to include details about exercise events and unit identifiers at that time. To enhance the realism of these narratives, the TPO developed a dynamic method by which the model can include the unit name,

type, echelon, activity, location, and call sign in the narratives as the report is generated.

The level of detail of the TACSIM COMINT model frees human scripters from many laborious tasks and allows them to focus on special cases and high priority events. As a result, TACSIM provides exercise participants with computer-generated intelligence which far surpasses any available during the past decade.

Sensor Flexibility

TACSIM tightly controls the sensor models to assure accurate portrayal of the actual sensor platform and system reporting capabilities. Recent requirements dictate that, in addition to traditional sensor suites, TACSIM accommodate new and conceptual assets. Exercise controllers can add and then customize these generic sensors and platforms to replicate any definable IMINT or ELINT system.

This is especially useful for assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Controllers can configure these assets in various ways. TACSIM can design sensors with a wide variety of operating limits and characteristics, such as range, altitude, velocity, and banking angle. Each platform can carry multiple sensor packages, complete with unique physical, electronic, and imaging characteristics. Now, units can test the contributions of new and conceptual assets in exercises when asset performance data is available.

TACSIM Analysis Operations Node

The TPO developed the TACSIM Analysis Operations Node (TALON) to meet new training exercise requirements. For example, TACSIM must disseminate products to allied forces in Korea and NATO countries. Since the model operates at multiple security levels, some of the raw product are not releasable to these forces. Furthermore, it is common for these countries to send staffs to exercises without their intelli-

gence analysts. The volume of TACSIM data may overwhelm such a small contingent and require analysis, which is not their function.

The TACSIM COMINT model ... frees human scripters from many ... tasks and allows them to focus on ... high priority events.

TPO designed TALON to analyze intelligence as an analyst would. TALON is inserted between the player and the TACSIM data connection. It can handle any message product that exercise participants cannot receive directly. TALON then processes all intelligence reports and produces a NATO/Republic of Korea (ROK) releasable summary.

TALON reports are released as Situation and SALUTE reports: Size, Activity, Location, Unit, Time, and Equipment. Textual statistics supplement these U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF) messages. They describe the type and volume of TACSIM reports that were used to produce each summary. TALON disseminates reports to exercise participants through the same communications system TACSIM uses.

The system is also useful at exercises in which U.S. Forces can't access secured facilities or didn't bring their intelligence analysis elements. TALON produces summarized collateral products even though the unit tasks a mixture of COMINT, ELINT, and IMINT sensors. (See Figure 2.)

TALON components include—

- ☐ Network gateways.
- ☐ X-Window-based user interface.
- ☐ USMTF reports parser.
- ☐ Relational data base management system.
- ☐ Intelligence tailoring and




Figure 2. TALON concept of operations.

- ☐ analysis algorithms.
- ☐ Report writers.
- ☐ System monitoring and maintenance utilities.

The heart of TALON is the tailoring and analysis module. It is composed of algorithms broken into four primary groups:

- ☐ The first group extracts and scores data from new reports.
- ☐ The second group correlates the new information with existing intelligence on the detected unit to form a single perception of the enemy situation.
- ☐ The third group translates numerical decision coefficients into English text.
- ☐ The fourth group prepares the information for inclusion into a USMTF message for transmission to exercise participants.

TACSIM After-Action Review User System

TACSIM and TALON can produce in excess of 100,000 intelligence reports during an exercise. The TACSIM After-Action Review User System (TAARUS) allows the operator to benefit from the training scenario through the analysis of exercise information to

find successes and failures. To support this need, the TPO provides the TAARUS. This is a graphical query system with access to all intelligence data stored in a relational data base.

**TACSIM and
TALON can
produce in excess
of 100,000
intelligence
reports during an
exercise.**

TACSIM provides TAARUS a copy (in real time) of every report it transmits to exercise participants and a copy of exercise ground truth data. Using an X-Window-based interface, an analyst can access any piece of information moments after it is disseminated to the training audience. You can group and filter data by various characteristics (for example, time, location, intelligence discipline, exercise participant, and sensor mission).

You can format the output as maps in—

- ☐ Defense Mapping Agency ter-

rain and standard military symbols.

- ☐ Multidimensional graphs.
- ☐ Predefined priority information windows.
- ☐ Tabular data generated by user-defined queries.

Using this system, exercise controllers can keep abreast of the latest intelligence events without tasking an entire staff to gather and collate the data. Map and graphical formats enable the presentation of large amounts of data in a usable form. TAARUS can further support the data by extended detail in tabular reports and summary windows.

National Wargaming System

National Wargaming System (NWARs) is designed to simulate tasking, reporting, and disseminating information from national intelligence collection assets. The Defense Support Projects Office (DSPO) developed NWARS for training and exercise support. These models include electronic, electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and infrared sensor collection.

NWARs reports are standard

USMTF and the CSP can release them just like those in TACSIM. NWARS is integrated with TACSIM so that both share the same input and output connections to the exercise combat driver. NWARS can also operate in a stand-alone mode with direct interface to exercise participants. In this case, you can enter mission taskings directly or remotely through collection management devices such as SWIFTHAWK.

Rapid Scenario Preparation Unit for Intelligence

The scenario data bases that drive the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), TACSIM, NWARS, and other service models are extremely large, detailed, and complex. Preparing and formatting this information before an exercise was a people-intensive task, requiring many months of effort. In order to minimize the cost, DSPO and TPO developed the Rapid Scenario Preparation Unit for Intelligence (RASPUTIN). RASPUTIN can construct an ac-

curate data base of friendly and enemy forces. (See Figure 3.) It uses detailed knowledge of—

- ☐ Doctrinal procedures.
- ☐ Force structure.
- ☐ Fixed target characteristics.
- ☐ Equipment characteristics.
- ☐ Terrain limitations.
- ☐ Weather data.

With this automated support, RASPUTIN operators can construct an entire exercise scenario in a matter of weeks rather than months. Once constructed, technicians insert the scenario into various simulations (for example, CBS and TACSIM). This guarantees that all systems begin the exercise with compatible representations of the battlefield. We estimate that the graphical interface and multi-simulation compatibility cut preparation time from 18 months to 2 weeks.

Once RASPUTIN details the scenario according to its knowledge bases, operators can customize the data according to specific situations and objectives. This provides the advantage of both exacting doctrine and experi-

ence in determining the final exercise data base.

(The TACSIM, TALON, TAARUS, RASPUTIN, and NWARS systems described in this article are directed by the U.S. Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command [STRICOM], TACSIM Project Office, 7900 Sudley Road, Suite 500, Manassas, VA 22110, 703-830-7607, and by the Defense Support Projects Office, 1670 Air Force Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20330-1670, 703-614-4653.)

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Jane Allison, Dan Ball, John Calloway, Mike Daconta, Tim Divecchia, Tim Halstead, Ruth LaVarney, Bill Maetzold, Joe Nelson, Judi Palumbo, and Ed Santiago of the TACSIM Project Office who also helped with this article.




Figure 3. RASPUTIN concept of operations.

Graphics by Kazuko Kiever

DEATH AT NARROW WATER: THE ANATOMY OF AN AMBUSH

by Captain Nicholas J. Eckert

The mature terrorists are continually learning from their mistakes and developing their expertise.

—British Army assessment of the Provisional Irish Republican Army

On 21 August 1979, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) dealt the British military the worst defeat it has ever suffered in Northern Ireland. In one brilliantly planned ambush at Narrow Water in County Down, the PIRA killed 18 British soldiers.

This death toll, coupled with the spectacular, same-day assassination of Lord Mountbatten in the Republic of Ireland, shook the British Army to the core. With their actions, the terrorists had offered conclusive proof that they were a deadly force in the Irish Troubles.

This particular ambush is worthy of analysis because it validates two principles of counterterrorist/insurgent operations:

- ☐ Over time, a terrorist organization will learn from its mis-

takes.

- ☐ Security forces that act predictably will meet with disaster.

To determine what happened you must examine Narrow Water's terrain and the combatants.

The Setting

Welcome to [Narrow Water], area of outstanding natural beauty.

—Road sign outside the ambush site

The Narrow Water area was an ideal spot to ambush a mounted security patrol. At Narrow Water, the A-2 Highway runs parallel to a canal connecting the town of Newry with the Irish Sea. To the southwest, the Republic of Ireland is just across the water.¹

An abandoned stone lodge (Photograph 1) (the gateway to Narrow Water Castle) stood on the northeast side of the roadway.



Photograph 1. The site where the old stone lodge stood. The gate was built after 1979.

Two hundred feet southeast of the lodge on the canal-side of the highway is a roadside rest area (Photograph 2). Army convoys routinely used the A-2 thoroughfare—a fact that local PIRA intelligence officers noted.

The Target

The unit caught in the PIRA trap at Narrow Water was a platoon from the 2d Battalion of the famous Parachute Regiment. An elite force, the "Paras" had a long history of operations in Northern Ireland. The Paras killed 13 unarmed Catholics in Derry in 1972. Needless to say, many members of the Nationalist community hated the Paras.² In a PIRA stronghold like South Down, they would be a popular "hit."

The platoon consisted of 30 men armed with light infantry weapons. On this fateful day, the platoon was moving from Ballykinler Barracks to Newry. The platoon moved in an armored Land Rover jeep and two 4-ton trucks.³ The Paras knew that the PIRA frequently used land mines against road-bound patrols. However, the soldiers apparently had no warning of any threat against them.⁴

The Unit

A PIRA Active Service Unit (ASU) from nearby South Armagh conducted the attack.⁵ Although the unit's precise composition is unknown, we can make three assumptions:

- ☐ It was an experienced terrorist cell with up to 10 members.⁶
- ☐ It was familiar with the Narrow



Photograph 2. The road side where the first bomb exploded is in the foreground with the tower house behind it. The gate and castle can be seen on the right.

Water area and the British Army units operating there.

- It had the support of the local population. (Nobody warned the British despite the fact that civilians lived less than a thousand feet from the ambush site.)⁷

The ASU's mission was simple: kill as many British soldiers as it could in a dramatic way.

The Plan

Because of a previous incident at Narrow Water, the terrorists knew how the Paras would probably respond to an attack. In 1976, an ASU had placed a command-wire-controlled bomb close to the A-2 Highway. The PIRA had planned to detonate it when a patrol of Royal Marines passed it. However, the men in the convoy saw the wires and evaded the trap. While withdrawing, the marines used the gate of Narrow Water Castle as a rally point and command post.⁸

The ASU planners decided the Paras were likely to take similar action if attacked on the highway. This offered an opportunity to conduct a dramatic two-phase ambush.

The ASU developed a simple plan. The first phase of the ambush would be nearly identical to the 1976 attack. PIRA operatives loaded a trailer with 1,000 pounds of explosives and covered it with

hay bales. They placed the trailer on the canal side of the road. The ASU didn't use command wires for the "Brits" to see this time. Instead, the ASU used a pulse from a model aircraft remote control to detonate the bomb from a secure position on the southwestern side of the canal.⁹

The ASU planned to detonate the bomb, then to rake the area with small arms fire. They intended to drive the surviving Paras into the nearest available cover—the Narrow Water Castle gate. There, the PIRA had buried a 500-pound land mine. This would finish off the platoon and any reinforcements.¹⁰

A Textbook Killing

Any soldier would admit as an operation it was very well done.

—British soldier commenting on the ambush

The Paras entered the kill zone along the roadway at 1630 hours. Although some of them saw the hay wagon, none of the soldiers thought it was out of place on a country highway.

The ASU allowed the Land Rover and the first truck to pass. When the last truck drove by the trailer, the ASU detonated the first bomb. Residents of Newry heard the blast 11 miles away. It had a shattering effect on the Paras. In the words of one survivor: "Everything went black and this noise, the only thing I can equate it to is thousands of gallons of water rushing...roaring like a waterfall."¹¹

The explosion tore apart the truck and killed six soldiers, badly wounding another two. A black cloud of smoke hung over a road littered with bodies and burning hay.¹² As the remaining soldiers milled around, ASU snipers fired on them. The Paras radioed for help and rushed from the road to the castle gate, into the second kill zone (see Figure 1).

Reinforcements quickly converged on the Narrow Water area, moving by Land Rover and




Figure 1. Trailer bomb blast.




Figure 2. Detonation at the gate.

helicopter. Lieutenant Colonel Blair, commander of the Queen's Own Highlanders Infantry Battalion, arrived on the scene. As he conferred with Major Fursman, the Paras' commander, under the castle gate, the ASU detonated the second bomb (see Figure 2).¹³

The second explosion in the confined space of the gateway was far more deadly than the first. It killed 12 soldiers, including Lieutenant Colonel Blair and Major Fursman. Two more suffered serious injuries. As the ASU maintained sniper fire, the remaining Paras reacted by firing wildly across the canal. They only succeeded in killing a British tourist.¹⁴

Shortly afterward, the ASU withdrew, and the ambush ended.

Summary

We will rip out [Britain's] sentimental, imperialist heart.

—PIRA statement issued after the ambush

In a single afternoon, the PIRA did far more than kill 18 soldiers. It made a mockery of British claims that the terrorists were "on the run." Because of this "clean hit" on the hated Paras, the PIRA's reputation in the Nationalist community soared.

Lessons Learned

The British experience at Narrow Water is a warning for armies that conduct counterterrorist/insurgent operations. A terrorist organization will learn from its mistakes and capitalize on any predictability its opponents exhibit. In the final analysis, an old saying still applies, "Those who cannot learn from the past are condemned to repeat it."

Endnotes

1. Bell Bowyer, *The Irish Troubles* (New York City: St. Martin's press, 1993), 512-513.
2. The "Nationalist" community refers to people (nearly all Catholic) who support Northern Ireland becoming part of the Republic of Ireland.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional IRA* (London: Corgi Books, 1989), 314-315.
6. Ibid.
7. When visiting the site, I saw homes by the main castle area. The residents routinely passed through the gate house to get to the highway.
8. Mark Urban, *Big Boys' Rules* (London: Faber and Faber, 1992), 85.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Max Arthur, editor, *Northern Ireland Soldiers Speak* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987), 133.
12. Bell, 573-574.
13. Bell, 574.
14. Ibid.

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- The quotation at the beginning of the article is from Coogan (page 356). I saw the tourist sign when visiting the site in March 1994.
- The British soldier's comment on the ambush is from Arthur (page 134). The IRA's boast at the end of the article is from the *An Phoblacht* article.

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FIRE SUPPORT DOCTRINE:



SENSOR TO SHOOTER

by Major Scott R. McMeen

Vignette: In April (1994), two senior officers visited the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Analysis and Control Element (ACE). They wanted to see how the ACE used input from high technology intelligence platforms to produce intelligence products and targeting information for participating units during National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 94-07. During the visit, both officers criticized the fire support process as "archaic." The field artillery intelligence officer kept quiet.

NTC Rotation 94-07, the Advanced Warfighting Experiment, Operation Desert Capture II (ODC II), Operation Desert Hammer is over. These general officers observed ODC II:

- ☐ The Army Chief of Staff.
- ☐ Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command.
- ☐ Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.
- ☐ Most of the branch school commandants.

They all agreed that the Army is moving in the right direction. Certainly the exercise brought the Army closer to its goal of automated command and control and a real-time common picture of the battlefield.

So why is field artillery lagging behind? Why do senior officers complain of "archaic" methods? While the rest of the Army is digitizing and streamlining, artillery is clinging to outmoded procedures.

What are these obsolete procedures? Is there a legitimate complaint?

To many, procedures for tactical fire direction appear unnecessarily complicated or restrictive. Why is it necessary, they ask, to send requests for fire through half a dozen fire support elements (FSEs) and two or three fire direction centers before the request finally reaches a firing system?

Why Not Sensor to Shooter?

In the age of high-tech precision sensors, self-location and reporting systems, and digital communications, couldn't we save a lot of time and assets (including unnecessary personnel) by simply linking sensors directly to shooters? It should be possible to link M1A2 tanks directly to Paladin howitzers, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) directly to Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). Why aren't we taking advantage of this capability?

Proponents of the "sensor to shooter" concept make four assumptions:

- ☐ High-tech sensors will detect targets consistently and accurately.
- ☐ When a sensor detects/locates a target, the only logical thing to do is immediately kill it.
- ☐ From the first and second points, it follows that sensors should talk directly to shoot-



ers.

- ☐ FSEs or fire direction centers (FDCs) hinder the rapid engagement of targets. Anything that slows down sensor to shooter time is an unmitigated evil. Therefore, we must remove FSEs and FDCs from the force structure.

Under certain circumstances, these assumptions could prove valid. It makes perfect sense to link sensors to shooters when executing a detailed fire support plan after fire support personnel have already made key tactical fire direction decisions. Current fire support doctrine allows for this direct link. But when processing targets of opportunity, sensor to shooter links will not prove effective.

When processing targets of opportunity, sensor to shooter links will not prove effective.

The assumptions that drive the "sensor to shooter" concept are demonstrably false. They ignore problems that our fire support doctrine was specifically designed to address. While direct sensor to shooter links are useful and appropriate when carefully planned, they simply do not make sense as a standard operating procedure.

Assumption 1

High tech sensors will detect targets consistently and accurately.

During NTC 94-07, various sensors sent data to the ACE, including—

- ☐ National systems.
- ☐ Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS).
- ☐ Rivet Joint (USAF signals intelligence [SIGINT] aircraft).
- ☐ GUARDRAIL (Army SIGINT aircraft).
- ☐ TRAILBLAZER (a vehicle-mounted communications intelligence system).
- ☐ The U-2.
- ☐ The P-3 Orion.
- ☐ Pioneer UAV.

While all of these systems provided valuable information, only the U-2 and national imagery provided what you could consider "target quality" intelligence. Target quality intelligence includes target locations and descriptions of sufficient accuracy to permit indirect fire systems to effectively engage targets.

These two platforms provided excellent pictures of enemy vehicles, fighting positions, obstacles, assembly areas, and logistic support areas. However, these sources were the least timely. The shortest time for analysts to disseminate a U-2 photo to the ACE was two hours. Most imagery took much longer to process and receive. If we had relied on imagery for targeting, we would have wasted ammunition.

Furthermore, personnel had to analyze most images before they could translate the image into target intelligence. The pictures we received normally had only one

location (the center of the image) annotated. Target analysts usually had to compare the image with the map and associate the image to the terrain to determine precise locations.

If a sensor sent the same photo directly to a shooter, the shooter would fire at the center grid without conducting further analysis. Shooters receive fire orders which only require execution.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The UAV was the intelligence workhorse of the exercise. Unlike other imagery sources, UAV pictures were "real time." The ACE saw the battle as it happened and provided an accurate description to the supported unit because of the UAV. However, while UAV imagery was timely, it was not accurate enough for targeting.

When using the forward looking infrared (FLIR) Moked 400 camera, which generally provided the clearest imagery, UAV target locations were wrong by as much as 1,000 meters. Unless analysts could verify the UAV location through terrain association or another intelligence source, the unit could not use the UAV grid alone. (Editors Note: The Pioneer UAV Company strived for 80 meters accuracy during ODC II. Addition-

ally, they can modify the Pioneer UAV during wartime by adding GPS which improves its accuracy. Hunter UAV operates with a GPS system.)

Joint STARS. This system provided valuable information about enemy movements, but was inadequate for targeting. Joint STARS detects moving vehicles, but cannot identify the vehicles, nor distinguish friendly from enemy movement. If Joint STARS detected a long column of vehicles moving through a choke point, a unit has sufficient data to initiate fires.

Normally, another source must report to identify targets and confirm their location. Joint STARS did an excellent job of "cross-cuing," or redirecting other intelligence assets.

Other Assets. Various SIGINT collectors (Rivet Joint, GUARDRAIL, and TRAILBLAZER) provided valuable information, but seldom of sufficient accuracy for targeting. The typical GUARDRAIL and TRAILBLAZER target location ellipse was 2,000 x 500 meters, far too inaccurate for targeting. However, Rivet Joint did provide precise locations for enemy air defense radars.

Nearly all of the information these sensors provided to the ACE required further analysis. In



most cases, another source had to confirm the information before we could service the target. To have placed any of these sensors in direct communications with a shooter would have produced meager results.

Assumption 2

When a sensor detects/locates a target, the only logical thing to do is immediately kill it.

This assumption applies in certain cases. Normally, we immediately engage high payoff targets (HPTs) with long-range offensive capabilities, such as MLRS. But does it always make sense to kill an HPT immediately? The Army typically includes air defense targets on HPT lists; but immediate engagement may not necessarily be the best option.

If the division plans a deep attack, should we engage air defense targets as acquired? Or should we engage them immediately before the attack, so the enemy will have little time to recover before friendly aircraft appear?

As a standard practice, direct sensor to shooter links generate serious problems.

If sensors pinpoint a high echelon enemy command post, should we engage it immediately? Or should we synchronize its destruction with some battlefield event, so that the command post's sudden disappearance will maximize enemy confusion?

Does it always make sense to kill a target? Target destruction often is difficult to achieve, requires high expenditures of ammunition, or poses significant risk to aerial fire support systems. Normally we can only neutralize or suppress the target.

Because neutralization and suppression are temporary effects, we must synchronize fire support with other battlefield operating systems to create the desired effect.

If you detect the enemy tank re-

serve, should you try to destroy it immediately? To try to destroy the target, the division may have to expend every allocated close air support sortie and fire MLRS rounds.

The best option may be to neutralize the enemy tank reserve at the point when it poses the greatest threat to friendly forces. Or we could track the tank reserve and attack when it is in a more vulnerable posture, so that division aviation can destroy it.

What if sensors locate a HPT and send a request for fire while their corresponding "shooter" is engaged with another high priority target? Should an MLRS battery interrupt its fires on active enemy batteries to engage an enemy communications site or logistic support area? A unit could place all these targets on their HPT list, and the priority of communications sites may exceed enemy artillery. As a better option, the unit could defer the fire mission on the communications site until completing the mission against the artillery.

Targeting is a dynamic process. To do it effectively, you must do more than review the current HPT list and attack guidance matrix. Target attack criteria and HPT criteria change constantly with the tactical situation.

To make an effective decision on when and how to engage a target, the decision maker must understand the—

- ☐ Commander's intent.
- ☐ Tactical situation.
- ☐ Status of fire support assets.

FSEs and FDCs perform these functions. Sensors, on the other hand, have limited knowledge of the tactical situation, and virtually no knowledge of the fire support status.

Assumption 3

Sensors should talk directly to shooters.

When a unit carefully plans and directs sensor to shooter links, they are appropriate and effective. For example, we often link Firefinder radars directly to the di-

vision's counterfire cell. This arrangement makes sense because Firefinder is a highly accurate counterbattery artillery system. Active enemy artillery will almost always merit immediate engagement.

We link task force maneuver scouts through a quick-fire channel to their supporting artillery. The scouts need the protection of immediate fire support, and anything forward of their positions is probably enemy.

However, does it make sense for Rivet Joint to talk directly with an MLRS battery, or for the UAV to talk directly to an aviation attack battalion? Under certain circumstances, you could answer yes. You could task the UAV to observe named areas of interest and target areas of interest and act as the "trigger" for an aviation attack. Rivet Joint might send air defense artillery radar locations directly to an MLRS battery tasked to provide suppression of enemy air defense fires.

It makes sense to link sensors to shooters when you—

- ☐ Apply the decide, detect, deliver methodology.
- ☐ Synchronize this with the maneuver plan.
- ☐ Ensure you have a target location.

However, as a standard practice, direct sensor to shooter links generate serious problems.

Fratricide. Fratricide is a major dilemma on the modern battlefield. While our sensor platforms can boast of impressive capabilities, they cannot positively identify a target as friendly or enemy. To determine whether or not a target is safe to fire requires experience, judgment, and an intimate knowledge of the tactical situation.

The responsible maneuver commander or his fire support coordinator is best qualified to determine if a target is friendly or enemy. Direct sensor to shooter links leave these key decision makers out of the process. For targets beyond the coordinated fire line, far away from friendly

forces, this is not an issue. However, when sensors detect a target close to friendly forces, we must not allow them to call for fires without coordination and clearance.

Automation fanatics will no doubt dismiss this statement as hopelessly backward. Intervehicular Information System (IVIS), Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), and other systems that automatically track friendly locations will make it "impossible" to mistake friendly forces for enemy forces. Nevertheless, participating units committed fratricide during NTC rotation 94-07 despite the presence of this new equipment.

The recent disaster in northern Iraq (the downing of two UH-60s by USAF aircraft on 14 April 1994) should serve as a further reminder that the problem of fratricide is still with us, in spite of advanced technology.

Finite resources. Like most everything else, fire support assets are a finite resource. The Army has only so many shooters and ammunition. To get the most out of what's available, doctrine says that commanders must **mass** their fires, and synchronize fires with the scheme of maneuver. If the Army allows every sensor to talk directly to a firing unit, it—

- ☐ Piecemeals fires.
- ☐ Swamps firing units with fire requests.
- ☐ Degrades the fire support focus.

Experience from NTC rotation 94-07 confirms this view. At the exercise after action review, a task force commander stated that his fire support assets were quickly overwhelmed by the number of sensor calls for fire. The sensors, in this case, were combat vehicle crews equipped with digital communications.

Execution. To synchronize and mass fires, you must carefully plan fire support. Sensor to shooter enthusiasts appear to believe that fire support is most effective when it is entirely sponta-

neous. The most critical consideration, in their view, is to rapidly engage whatever the sensor wants to engage.

This is an important consideration, sometimes an overriding one. However, we should not leave the decision to engage targets of opportunity to tank commanders and squad leaders. Elements in a position to see targets generally take a rather narrow view of the tactical situation.

To an infantry squad pinned down by an enemy machine gun, that machine gun is the highest priority target on the planet. Likewise, when a tank platoon conducts an attack, a single BMP in a good firing position is the highest payoff target imaginable. Even operators of remote high-tech sensors are apt to be less than objective about the relative importance and accuracy of their target reports.

The maneuver commander and the fire support coordinator, with a better overall picture of the tactical situation, are best qualified to determine which targets of opportunity require immediate attention. They should decide when to divert fire support assets from pre-assigned tasks to engage unexpected enemy forces.

Fire support principles. Direct sensor to shooter links violate several principles of fire support coordination:

- ☐ Consider all attack means.
- ☐ Use the most effective means.
- ☐ Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support.

A sensor that communicates to a single fire support asset has only one option: engage that target. This fire support unit may not be the most effective means to engage the target; it may not even be able to engage the target.

However, if the sensor communicates with several fire support assets, it may violate another principle:

- ☐ Avoid unnecessary duplication.

On the other hand, we can link

an FSE to a variety of shooters, and it is trained to choose the most appropriate shooter to engage a target.

Assumption 4

FSEs and FDCs hinder the rapid engagement of targets.

This article demonstrates that FSEs and FDCs are still essential. While it is possible to bypass them, you may end up with desynchronized fire support. Our high-tech sensors still cannot—

- ☐ Locate and identify targets accurately.
- ☐ Decide when and how we should engage targets.
- ☐ Protect friendly forces from friendly fire.
- ☐ Manage fire support assets.

Automated systems will end the perception that we must streamline fire request procedures.

Conclusion

Improving technology will make the performance of these tasks faster and easier. Indeed, advanced automated systems will end the perception that we must streamline fire request procedures. This will occur when we can automatically and rapidly review fire requests.

Automated systems, however, will never relieve leaders of their command and control responsibilities. Commanders and fire support coordinators still protect friendly forces, establish priorities, and manage scarce fire support resources.

These issues will remain no matter how sophisticated the technology. It appears we should maintain the field artillery's "archaic" methods—for a while yet.

MAJ McMeen is the FAIO for the 24th ID (Mech). He has held numerous positions in artillery battalions, and served as an instructor at the Field Artillery School and Command and General Staff College.

An OPORD in the Life of a Brigade S2



by Captain Jon S. Cleaves

This article tracks the brigade S2's actions during the tactical decision making process. With each step, I will scrutinize the S2's functions and contributions and the maneuver commander's expectations.

Finally, I will examine some preparations to simplify execution of these steps when it counts. The scenario for this article is a U.S. heavy maneuver brigade conducting combat operations in a fictional theater. The focus is on the S2's actions during the tactical decision making process for a deliberate attack operations order (OPORD). The enemy uses the heavy threat model doctrine in this scenario.

Planning

The S2 and another captain from the S3 plans section return from the division OPORD in the back of a UH-1 helicopter. Over the whine of the engine, the S2 radios the battlefield information coordination center (BICC) at the main command post (CP). The S2 instructs the BICC to prepare the initial situation templates for mission analysis.

Based on his knowledge of the enemy and a rudimentary analysis of the terrain, the S2 formulates three basic enemy courses of action (COAs).

The BICC and a shift of intelligence analysts execute the threat integration portion of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. The BICC uses many tools, including—

- ☐ Doctrinal templates.
- ☐ Topographic maps in various scales and types.
- ☐ Automated terrain analysis data.
- ☐ Weather forecasts.
- ☐ Tactical planning factors.

Mission Analysis

The S2 arrives at the main CP and begins the mission analysis process. He must present a number of feasible enemy COAs. Then the commander will develop his guidance and the S3 will develop friendly COAs and the restated brigade mission based on the enemy COAs.

The S2 and S3 must derive specified and implied reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) tasks to prepare the R&S warning order. Normally, three hours elapse between the end of the division OPORD and completion of mission analysis.

Time limits strain the S2 section to accomplish all of the required tasks. Clearly, the S2 must serve as the brigade IPB expert.

While doctrine covers many answers, you do not have time to "hit the books." It will take a well-trained S2 shop to accomplish the mission. If the S2 section spends the allotted time for mission analysis to develop situation templates, the R&S warning order will not get done.

The converse is also true. It takes proficiency for the S2 to execute all critical functions under the severe time constraints. He must also train others and delegate tasks.

Commander's Guidance

Mission analysis is complete. The commander and the S3 huddle over the map and situation templates, drawing boundaries on the acetate. After some reflection, the commander issues his guidance and initial intent. This guidance reflects a lifetime of maneuver experience and dynamic leadership. Unique among the staff, the S2 both drives and receives guidance.

The commander explains how he wants to fight the enemy based on the situation the S2 pro-

vided him. He explains what he must know about the enemy to succeed and how he sees the battle and its conclusion. Thus, the S2 and commander must thoroughly understand each other. However, there is no program of instruction for this critical relationship.

Courses of Action

The commander leaves. Battle staff members discuss specific areas of the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs), as plans officers develop three friendly COAs. The COAs must be viable, comply with the commander's guidance, and defeat the enemy the S2 portrayed. This is why the S2 must help develop the friendly COAs as an equal participant.

The S2 must ensure that combat arms officers do not operate in a vacuum. Too often, planners develop COAs alone, without a cooperative effort with the S2. The staff must wargame each COA against an uncooperative enemy.

The S2 has little time, and will have even less later if the staff must scramble to replace a COA during the deliberate wargaming process.

The commander returns. The battle staff briefs and compares three friendly COAs using the military decision making process. The commander selects a refined COA and issues further guidance. The staff then conducts a deliberate wargame of the selected COA.

This is the most difficult step. It requires the combined effort of each battle staff member to synchronize quickly and precisely all available combat power. This will ensure the brigade can defeat accurately predicted, critical enemy events before they can affect the brigade.

Targeting

A plan that does not integrate the intelligence BOS into the operation will fail. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the targeting process. The S2 is a key player in and must thoroughly understand the first two steps of the three steps in targeting: **decide, detect, and deliver.**

Decide phase. During the decide phase, the S2 selects high value targets (HVTs) that the staff develops into high payoff targets (HPTs). Should the S2 fail to recognize the importance of a key enemy capability, the commander and staff cannot make an educated targeting decision.

Detect phase. The S2 is the key player during the detect phase. His R&S plan must ensure that assets find the HPTs the commander targeted. The R&S plan must use all brigade resources. It must also focus on those critical enemy events and capabilities that influence the commander's decisions.

An example of the level of detail necessary to integrate the other BOSs is the use of the combat observation/lasing team (COLT). The COLT is a brigade-level fire support observer. It can observe distant targets and call and designate for precision munitions. But the brigade owns few COLT teams.

You must consider: *Will the COLT team observe a named area of interest or a scatterable mine target? Will they call for conventional fires or designate for Copperhead, Hellfire, or A-10 munitions? Will they report on the brigade command, brigade operations/intelligence, or the fire support net?*

The entire staff must work together to answer these questions and to decide how best to attack each target. Hopefully the S2 predicted, and the R&S plan identified, each critical target.

Rehearsal

The S2 walks out onto the terrain model and turns to face the audience. They want to know pre-

cisely what enemy forces and actions they must defeat. Inaccurate or incomplete information could result in the death of U.S. soldiers.

There is no room for excuses. It doesn't matter which national system cannot down link or which part of the MI communications architecture is not working. A shortage of personnel to fill an already deficient Table of Organization and Equipment is no excuse. You cannot make the excuse that the advanced course focused on Korea not Bosnia.

The S2 must describe each event the enemy performs in precise detail and in terms each commander and staff officer understands.

After the maneuver rehearsal, task force S2s, the MI company commander and executive officer, scout platoon leaders, COLT leaders, OH-58D pilots, and other members of the intelligence team gather to conduct an R&S rehearsal. Each intelligence team member then demonstrates knowledge of his place in the operation.

No S2 is an island. The S2 performs staff supervision over the R&S plan. He must coordinate this team effort to make it work.

Plan of Action

What follows is a plan to prepare the brigade S2 for combat operations. Note that the brigade S2 should accomplish these tasks **now, not after deployment**; then it is too late.

Task #1: Learn the job. Make those with the knowledge and responsibility teach you what you need to know. Start with the division G2. He thoroughly understands the tactical intelligence process and can train you on those critical skills. Then you can train your subordinates. Make the G2 take the time.

Task #2: Learn the commander. Doctrinal publications and intelligence courses teach us how to perform the IPB process, but the commander must teach you his idiosyncrasies. In the end,

he is your audience. Lead him to a map and a clean piece of acetate. Then make him tell you how he wants to see all the IPB products.

You communicate primarily with the commander through priority intelligence requirements (PIR).

Task #3: Learn your friends' jobs. Each BOS uses its own doctrine, tactics, language, and view of the battlefield. Sit with the rest of the battle staff and learn their business as often as possible. Make one of the three friendly COA sketches. Let the engineer prepare your terrain overlay while you do his engineer battlefield assessment. Get in a tank or bradley during gunnery. Actively participate in each BOS!

Task #4: Focus on warfighting. Staff officers often complain that administrative duties prevent effective training on warfighting tasks. This is a challenge for the S2. Make the time to train. Get away from headquarters. Your section can develop situation templates in the bowling alley lounge, if necessary. Inspect an arms room for the BICC, while he trains your section on terrain analysis. Practice the deliberate wargaming process continually. Don't break your focus, focus on warfighting skills.

Warfighting skills perish over time and are the staff officer's equivalent to individual marksmanship. For the S2, the ability to analyze and predict battlefield events is critical.

Task #5: Establish a team of teams. The brigade intelligence team consists of soldiers with varied skills, including: task force S2s, OH-58D pilots, task force scouts, ground surveillance radar operators, MI company soldiers, air defense artillery scouts, chemical and engineer reconnaissance teams, COLT personnel, and MP squads.

Gather them together in a room and introduce them to each other. Encourage them to train together and brief their doctrine once a week. Ensure they all participate

(Continued on page 53)

DOCTRINAL ISSUES in JOINT TARGETING

(Editors Note — Reprinted from **A Common Perspective**, the Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter [July 1994]. Some of the terminology, guidance, and issues mentioned are not resolved or approved as joint doctrine. The joint doctrine development community is working to resolve these issues and should approve the appropriate doctrinal publications next year.)

by Lieutenant Commander Dan Smith, USN

The importance of careful selection of targets for air attack is emphasized by our experience.

—U.S. Strategic Bombing Surveys (1945).

The military has formalized targeting as a discipline for only 60 years. During the interwar years, the Army Air Corps started an Air Corps Tactics School (ACTS), which emphasized and quantified basic targeting principles.

ACTS developed the classic paradigm of the six-phase targeting cycle (see Figure 1) and developed the concept of strategic bombing. The U.S. effectively used this concept against the Germans in World War II under the brilliant leadership of General Curtis LeMay (the first Joint Forces Air Component Commander [JFACC]). ACTS doctrine called for bombing the enemy's "centers of gravity" to demoralize their population.

After the war, Paul Nitze, George Ball, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Fred Searls wrote U.S. Strategic Bombing Surveys based on lessons learned during World War II. These surveys set the stage for Air Force development of the modern principles of strategic targeting.

The primary lesson was that the U.S. must develop greater focus and precision for strategic bombing to ensure efficient use of re-

sources and humane treatment of civilians. Since World War II, the Air Force has led the development of targeting doctrine. This effort culminated in the excellent AP 200-17/18 series of service publications on targeting and targeting intelligence.

Thesis

Since Desert Storm, the initiative to develop joint targeting doctrine has shifted to theater commanders in chief. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-sponsored exercises, like the Ocean Venture and Agile Provider series, have tested and refined emerging joint doctrine.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also participated in developing joint targeting doctrine by bringing service and theater targeting personnel together. This initiative occurred through the Military Targeting Intelligence Committee and its Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Working Group. DIA's leadership and the joint staff's diligence produced the second draft of **Joint Publication 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support to Targeting**.

This publication incorporates many initiatives developed in theaters such as U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Atlantic Command since Desert Storm.

Significant issues in joint doctrine are still unresolved. The

objective of this article is to list those unresolved doctrinal issues from a nonparochial perspective (what is most combat effective).

Issues

Following is a discussion of issues that surfaced during Desert Storm. The joint community is slowly working them into doctrine. They involve sensitivities over the operational discretion of the warfighting commander and combat efficiency of his forces and resources.

JIPTL and the Air Tasking Order

The Joint Task Force (JTF) staff developed the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) to focus the JTF planning effort before the 72-hour air tasking order (ATO) cycle. This target cycle continuously revolves and generates ATOs three to five days from the current ATO. The JIPTL process enhances the forward vision of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). It projects resources against the enemy's critical warfighting nodes and war-sustaining capabilities.



Figure 1. Targeting Cycle.

The intelligence process supports construction of the war JIPTL from—

- ☐ Indications and warning.
- ☐ Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
- ☐ Data base management of enemy order of battle.
- ☐ Enemy target systems analysis.

The JTF staff developed the centralized system of national, theater, and operational joint intelligence centers to support these JFC efforts. (See Figure 2.) However, we still need to resolve these issues:

- ☐ Should the JIPTL drive the ATO?
- ☐ Who assigns execution of the JIPTL to the JFACC and other component commanders?
- ☐ Who should draft and validate the JIPTL?

JTCB Authority

The JTF staff developed the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) because of coordination problems during air operations over Iraq in early 1991. The JTCB is an advisory body only; it sits at the discretion of the JFC to provide guidance on targeting issues beyond the forward edge of the battle area.

The JTCB's objective is to project the campaign in advance of the ATO and the force movement order. Tests of the concept during joint exercises have proven highly successful.

The JTCB can efficiently address staff/component targeting issues when the JFC's deputy chairs this forum, and the commander issues clear, concise guidance. It doesn't matter what forces the component representative brings to the JTCB bargaining table; what counts is how well the component commander uses JFC resources to perform his mission.

We must still resolve these issues:

- ☐ If the JTCB validates the JIPTL, does it usurp the JFACC's authority? Does the JIPTL hinder the combat com-




Figure 2. USACOM Targeting Flow Diagram.

mander?

- ☐ If the JIPTL involves more than several hundred targets (Desert Storm involved thousands), can the JTCB still consider the details or should another body, like the JFACC guidance, apportionment, and targeting cell, draft the JIPTL?
- ☐ Should the JFC staff the JTCB as a full staff element or should the JTCB rely on other staffs for its operation, like the joint force fires coordinator (JFFC)?

JFACC and JFFC

We must resolve the relationship between the JFACC and the JFFC:

- ☐ What mission does the JFFC perform? The JTF staff developed the JFFC in the Atlantic theater to provide coordination of converging ground fires. The staff would work with the JFACC to coordinate battle operations.
- ☐ Where does the JFFC fit into joint doctrine? Is it a commander, like the JFACC? Is it a fires coordinator on the JFC staff? Do they work for the JFC J3?
- ☐ Does the presence of a JFFC usurp the authority of the JFACC?

Three Phases of BDA

BDA is a vital component of combat assessment. While the JTF J3 is responsible for combat assessment because it measures the effectiveness of the JFC's campaign plans, BDA is a J2 function. It requires an all-source assessment of the real effects of ordnance on enemy facilities and forces. The three phases of BDA follow.

Phase I involves initial reports on the physical damage the component forces levied on the enemy. It involves more human intelligence than any other phase. It is based on joint tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance mission reports from aircrews or other debriefs.

Phase II is an assessment of functional damage to the enemy. This is the responsibility of the JTF J2 (and his JTF Joint Intelligence Center [JIC]). For example, what difference does a hole in a bunker make if signals intelligence indicates that the enemy's command and control capability still functions?

Phase III is the BDA bottom line. How have our efforts to degrade or deprive the enemy's warfighting capabilities damaged him? This involves all his command and control systems, trans-

portation networks, energy distribution, communications, sea lanes, munitions depots, air defense, ports, airfields, and ground forces and their bases.

The theater J2 (with the theater JIC) conducts target systems assessment of joint and allied effects against enemy facilities and forces. However, these issues remain:

- ☐ Who should conduct BDA? Should the DIA feed the bottom line to the JFC or should the JFC, supported by the JIC (national/theater/operational), conduct their own BDA?
- ☐ What resources should the intelligence community commit to perform BDA? How far up the chain should BDA be disseminated (The JFC or the White House)? Who should overlook the details to assess the JFC's combat effectiveness at a micro level and macro level?
- ☐ Who prepares and releases the bottom line? How is a consensus bottom line coordinated among reporting authorities?

Targeting Automation —Who Gets the Gouge?

In the last three years, we have seen dramatic developments in automated data bases and con-

nectivity throughout the chain of command. User-friendly targeting data bases and accessible shared imagery files provide JTF and component staffs with intelligence, tailored to their needs.

Furthermore, joint intelligence work stations have broadened connectivity with bandwidth networks that support simultaneous imagery, data base, and analyst-to-analyst exchanges. The satellite video teleconference has supplied a backup to theater and national automatic data processing, which often becomes a preferred network for force management.

- ☐ With increased bandwidth connectivity and complexity, and the cost of maintaining specialized communications circuits, who should be on line? Who determines the extent of accessibility?
- ☐ If the joint task force staff develops a force management network for the joint warfighter, how far down should the network extend? And how do we feed the service systems into the joint systems?
- ☐ If information is power, how do we balance dissemination and operational access, while guaranteeing OPSEC?

Conclusion

The targeting discipline works

at the intersection of operations and intelligence. Because it serves more than one master, targeting doctrine often causes conflict among services and theaters. Doctrinal issues for joint targeting also cause air and/or ground debates. These complicate the old battle operations doctrine and reach into the heart of the enduring question of who wins wars.

Joint universal lessons learned and JCS-directed joint exercises provide the objective forums for settling joint doctrinal issues, like those discussed above. The battlefield should determine the best methods for winning wars—even when the battles are simulated.

Some doctrinal principles are enduring, proven over and over again in peace and war, like the six phases of the targeting cycle. Others are evolving, like the unique contributions of the JFACC to modern joint warfare and the developing usefulness of the JTCB to foster true "jointness" at the operational level of warfare. We need to remain open to the next war's joint doctrine requirements; not simply to what we did to win the last war.

Lieutenant Commander Smith is currently the J2 Staff Officer for Targeting Plans and Policy, USACOM J2.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame. Anyone can nominate an individual for induction into the MI Hall of Fame. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination.

A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI which reflects favorably on the MI Corps. In certain isolated instances (particularly in the case of junior soldiers), the nomination may be based on heroic actions rather than other documented contributions.

Nominees cannot be employed by the U.S. Government in any capacity at the time of their nomination. Individuals cannot be self-nominated. An annual Hall of Fame Board convenes to review nominations and to make recommendations to the Chief of Military Intelligence. However, the Chief of Military Intelligence is the final approving authority for inductions into the Hall of Fame.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (CPT Kirby Daras), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; or call DSN 821-1180 or 602-533-1180.

Intelligence Support in the BCE

by Captain Richard E. Nock

The U.S. Combined Forces Command Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) is one of only three Army BCEs. It operates at theater or operational level of war (Figure 1). It provides liaison between the ground component commander (GCC) and the air component commander (ACC). The BCE coordinates and synchronizes air operations in support of the—

- GCC ground operations plan and scheme of maneuver.
- Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command and his campaign plan.

The BCE is a subordinate staff element of the CJ3 (combined, joint level G3). Many officers and soldiers from different branches of the Army, including MI, form the BCE. It consists of a headquarters and two divisions (plans and operations) that are organized into nine sections. Additionally, field army liaison officers collocate with the BCE.

To further facilitate operations, Army ground liaison officers and Republic of Korea (ROK) battle coordination officers are also part of the BCE. However, they are located with U.S. and ROK air force tactical fighter wings throughout the peninsula.

Plans and Operations Divisions

An intelligence section supports each division in the BCE. The intelligence section supports the plans division and the fusion section supports the operations division (Figure 2). These two sections provide intelligence support based on the different functions of the two divisions.

The plans division represents the GCC to the combined targeting cell of the combined targeting board. The plans division represents the GCC when the targeting board develops the pre-positioned integrated tasking order

(pre-ITO) or the subsequent ITO. In essence, the ITO is the theater deep battle plan.

The ITO is the ACC's air operations order. Any flight planned for that day is put into the ITO. Additionally, units must schedule missile launches in the ITO (hence ITO and not air tasking order). This cycle begins 36 hours before execution.

The targeting cell and the targeting board consist of representatives from all theater components. They meet daily to plan the ITO for the day 36 hours out. The plans division coordinates and executes the future battle. This focus differs from the operations division focus on the execution of the ITO (the current battle).

The operations division represents the GCC to the ACC execution cell during the coordinated execution of pre-ITOs or subsequent ITOs to synchronize the theater deep battle.

The operations division recommends the diversion of air assets based on differences between the estimated (on which the ITO is based) and current situations. Remember, the targeting board plans the ITO on an estimated situation 36 hours in advance.

The operations division also recommends the diversion of

flight sorties based on new high payoff targets (HPTs). To perform this function, the operations division is collocated with the air operations center.

Intelligence Section Support

The plans division intelligence section collects and briefs all-source ground, targeting, and order of battle intelligence. This intelligence supports the plans division when the targeting board prepares pre-ITOs and ITOs. During wartime or exercises, this section briefs the daily CJ2 (combined, joint level G2) intelligence estimate to the targeting board.

During armistice, the intelligence section compiles enemy unit dispositions, compositions, doctrine, and tactics. The section also acts as liaison between the GCC, primarily the G2, and the ACC. This ensures the CJ2 disseminates intelligence to the USAF intelligence organizations that effectively support the ACC.

The intelligence section also provides liaison with other services, besides the USAF, or countries that might fly in support of the Army. These organizations also ensure they share ground intelligence in support of the target-




Figure 1.

ing board. In addition, the intelligence section provides liaison for intelligence from other U.S. and allied intelligence services in theater.

Tasks the intelligence section performs include—

Armistice Tasks.

- ☐ Compiles reports and estimates from the CJ2 estimates section to provide targeting intelligence to plans division for the pre-ITO.
- ☐ Considers GCC targeting guidance and commander's intent, then requests information on high value targets (HVTs). The plans division then develops HPTs from HVTs and recommends HPTs to the targeting board.
- ☐ Interprets ground intelligence for other component intelligence agencies that support the targeting board.
- ☐ Maintains current situation of enemy ground forces and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for the theater.
- ☐ Serves as the subject matter expert on Army intelligence and prepares intelligence orientations on IPB, Army intelligence organizations, and enemy ground order of battle.
- ☐ Acts as liaison between theater intelligence organizations, the GCC, and the ACC.

Wartime or Exercise Tasks.

- ☐ Provides a daily situation briefing to the targeting board planning cell based on the current J2 intelligence summary.
- ☐ Advises USAF and ROK air force targeting personnel and intelligence analysts on the importance of particular targets and the significance of enemy ground force activity.
- ☐ Identifies new targets for potential attack in conjunction with CJ2 estimates and targets. Recommends new targets to the plans division based on the GCC targeting guidance and the changing enemy situation.

Fusion Section Support

While the intelligence section focuses on the future battle, the fusion section focuses on the current battle. The fusion section compiles the latest intelligence and combat information to confirm pre-planned targets or to update their locations.

Tasks the fusion section performs include—

Armistice Tasks.

- ☐ Maintains current intelligence on enemy ground forces.
- ☐ Interprets intelligence from the Army perspective for the ACC.
- ☐ Prepares intelligence orientations and briefings.

Wartime or Exercise Tasks.

- ☐ Provides enemy ground force composition and disposition to the ACC commander and the execution cell.
- ☐ Analyzes intelligence on enemy ground forces and the friendly situation to help refine and validate targets. Validates ITO targets approximately four hours before time over target. If the section can't validate the target, it recommends targets based on emerging HPTs. The operations division can then divert air assets to service the new targets.
- ☐ Processes requests for immediate tactical air reconnaissance and electronic warfare and electronic combat (EW/EC). Forwards reconnaissance requests, target validations, and EW/EC support measure requests that GCC operations require.
- ☐ Acts as liaison when CJ2 and field army elements validate each other's targets with current intelligence.

Conclusion

Both BCE intelligence sections challenge MI officers and 96B Intelligence Analysts. Most positions require a 5U additional skill identifier (ASI) for officers and a Q8 ASI for NCOs. The Air Ground Operations School Battle Staff Course awards this ASI.

The Army just recently acquired the BCE, and is still developing its roles, responsibilities, and functions. As future technologies enhance theater warfighting capabilities, the BCE can effectively orchestrate and synchronize all theater warfighting assets for the Combined Forces Commander.




Figure 2.

Graphics by Sharon Riggs

CPT Nock is an MIOBC instructor at the Intelligence Center. Previous assignments include BCE J3, 8th Army, Korea, as Chief, Intelligence Section; EW platoon leader and XO, C Company, 109th MI Battalion; and assistant S2, 1st Brigade, 5th ID. Before attending OCS, CPT Nock served as a Russian interrogator. He has a master's degree from the University of Southern California.

Training for the Improved GUARDRAIL V

by Captain Max J. Corneau

Bravo Company, 15th MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) is a case study in the Army's crawl-walk-run training philosophy. Our company deployed the Improved GUARDRAIL V (IGRV) System three times in a 100-day period as part of: Casper's Switchblade, the 504th MI Brigade train-up; Phantom Saber III, the III Corps train-up; and Warfighter, the III Corps Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercise.

Although similar to the GUARDRAIL V system our unit had been operating, the IGRV represented a new set of operational challenges. As defined in FM 25-101, **Battle Focused Training**, we were well below our mean in the band of excellence because of new equipment fielding.

The unit started from scratch in terms of training and experience. Initially, our unit had to—

- ☐ Write system assembly and disassembly SOPs.
- ☐ Order spare parts.
- ☐ Establish tactics, techniques, and procedures for operations.

Crawl Phase

The unit established baseline



training standards and milestones in August 1993 to measure success during the December exercise. During the unit's first deployment—the crawl phase—we measured success by the disassembly and reassembly time for the integrated processing facility (IPF) and its associated subsystems.

We also had to confirm our ability to maintain continuous aerial surveillance by synchronizing relief-on-station of the RC-12D Airborne Relay Facility aircraft. During relief-on-station operations, an airplane replaces one of the two aircraft the ground based 2K Interoperable Data Link System (IDLS) is already tracking. The airborne transmitter on the mission aircraft is powered down while the relief aircraft powers up. Optimally, the 98G linguist in the IPF doesn't notice the relief process.

We painstakingly documented the teardown and reassembly procedures for the IPF and subsystems. Soldiers divided each task into various subtasks to determine work-hour movement requirements. The first deployment was slow and meticulous. Soldiers sometimes didn't have

proper tools and were unfamiliar with many tasks. We failed to meet the 24-hour teardown and reassembly standard by nearly 6 hours.

However, aircraft operations went particularly well during Casper's Switchblade. We performed relief-on-station during all three days of the exercise without a problem.

Although we did not meet the time standard, the operation was successful. We safely deployed our new system for the first time and thoroughly documented every procedure (whether right or wrong) for future reference. One aircrew performed an emergency landing without incident while returning from a night mission. During Casper's Switchblade, we safely sortied 13 aircraft for a total of 66 flight hours.

Although similar to the GUARDRAIL V system our unit had been operating, the IGRV represented a new set of operational challenges.

Walk Phase

During the second deployment—the walk phase—we attempted to—

- ☐ Refine IPF assembly and disassembly.
- ☐ Improve internal and external communications with our intelligence consumers.
- ☐ Establish the AN/TSC-87 tactical commander's terminal (TCT) network throughout III Corps.

The TCT is normally located as





low as the division analysis and control element. It prints out IGRV reports and provides secure UHF voice capability. The IPF transmitted voice and data via the microwave data link to the RC-12D aircraft orbiting up to 31,000 feet above ground level. The airborne relay system transmits separate voice and data signals on secure

AN/ARC-164 UHF radios to the divisional TCTs.

Higher headquarters defined mission success for this deployment as the successful transmission of communications intelligence reports from the IPF to our consumers through their TCTs. Our first priority was to answer corps priority intelligence requirements whenever possible. During the exercise, the Fort Hood Battlefield Simulation Center (BSC) fed intelligence to the IPF. We only passed intelligence to the IPF and divisions when our IGRV was fully

operational and flying. The unit levied this requirement on itself to ensure realism.

Our unit deployed the system in slightly less than 24 hours during Phantom Saber III. Once the exercise started, TCTs across the corps began passing data. Although none of the TCTs worked all of the time, units reported only minor and infrequent failures. B Company dispatched a two-per-



Improved GUARDRAIL V: AN/USD-9A

The AN/USD-9A is a combined airborne and ground remotely controlled communications intelligence system. It is designed to provide intercept and direction finding information on tactical enemy emitters. The information is processed and reported in near real-time to tactical commanders. This equipment is organic to corps and supports corps, divisions, and ACRs.

DESCRIPTION: The Improved GUARDRAIL V is comprised of—

- ☐ AN/ARW-83 airborne relay facility (ARF) mounted in the RC-12D aircraft.
- ☐ Integrated processing facility (IPF) consisting of four AN/TSQ-105 interconnected vans.
- ☐ AN/TSC-116 improved commander's tactical terminal (ICTT) (up to 32 terminals) or AN/TSC-87 tactical commander's terminal (TCT) at the supported commands (ECB).
- ☐ AN/MJQ-26 power distribution system (PDS), mounted on two 40-foot trailers.
- ☐ AN/ARM-163 auxiliary ground equipment (AGE) maintenance and test set (which is at the airfield).

A typical mission requires two ARFs to orbit in an area of interest. The IPF sends data commands to and receives information from the ARFs through a secure data link. The IPF (which houses all operational personnel) processes the information and reports (using the ARFs as a radio relay) to the ICTTs/TCTs in the field. The IPF is linked to the worldwide automatic digital network (AUTODIN) through the echelon Army Common User System gateway.

REPLACES: GUARDRAIL V

MODEL DIFFERENCES: The IGRV ARF is mounted in the RC-12D aircraft, and the IPF is mounted in four interconnecting vans. The GUARDRAIL ARF was mounted in an RU-21H aircraft, and the IPF was mounted in three interconnecting vans.



All photographs by Thomas Daley

son electronic maintenance contact team (MOS 33R personnel) whenever a TCT consumer called. We dispatched five contact teams to the five TCT outstations during the exercise.

During Phantom Saber III, the unit outperformed existing standards for IPF teardown and reassembly, TCT connectivity, and aviation operations. We successfully flew 18 RC-12D sorties for a total of 99 mission hours, completing every G2 mission tasking.

Run Phase

The highlight of the III Corps Warfighter—the run phase—occurred when we disassembled and reassembled the IPF in 18 hours. (The first deployment took almost twice as long.) The Mission Operations Platoon reduced this task down to one huge crew drill. Every soldier now knows what to do during each phase of IPF teardown and setup. Goals for this deployment were to—

- ☐ Maximize TCT connectivity.
- ☐ Refine IPF movement techniques.
- ☐ Synchronize intelligence analysis and dissemination with key friendly events.

The IPF mainframe computer was not mission capable when the exercise began because of a power surge during the last deployment. Multiple disk drives failed, which stripped us of even the most basic diagnostic troubleshooting capabilities. Many people doubted we could repair the mainframe in a field environment. However, the IPF was able to process and pass intelligence throughout the corps when the

exercise began.

Between missions, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) maintenance personnel and a dedicated depot representative not only repaired the disk drives but also gutted the computer and replaced all primary internal wiring harnesses. By the end of Warfighter, the mainframe was fully mission capable and newly overhauled.

Flight operations during the corps Warfighter presented new challenges. The unit sortied 30 aircraft and flew 152 hours. During the eight days of the exercise, we cancelled only one mission, because of dense fog. However, the corps soon forgot the impact of the cancelled mission when we successfully supported 20 hours of unscheduled continuous two-plane coverage during Phase IV of the Warfighter exercise.

As commander, I assessed we could have maintained the surge for 25 more hours, based on aircraft availability, pilot endurance, IEW maintenance posture, and IPF operator (98G) endurance.

Lessons Learned

Before the three exercises, a III Corps TCT intelligence architecture didn't exist. The first deployment demonstrated the importance of TCT operator training at corps and division levels. Our electronic maintenance platoon conducted standardized training for all MI units on Fort Hood. We then flew our aircraft to Fort Bliss and Fort Riley to train TCT operators.

After the second deployment, we generated a "must have" list of line replaceable units whose failure would result in a not-mission-capable status. The cost of this list was over \$1.7 million. Armed with this list, the unit is less vulnerable today to a catastrophic failure.

B Company's Mission Opera-

tions Platoon disassembled and reassembled the IPF six times in a 103-day period. The platoon reduced the time by 12 hours from the first to the third iteration; because of repetition and excellent leadership.

During all three deployments, pilot availability was a critical issue. We reconfirmed that IGRV operations are pilot intensive.

Tactical Innovations

Although simple and trustworthy, the division TCTs are archaic and can hold only 8 to 10 messages in the buffer. The company's electronic maintenance platoon devised a TCT upgrade using a laptop computer with modem and printer. Once the concept was proven, the battalion S4 section ordered enough laptop computers, printers, and software to support all TCT consumers.

Although we don't have the hardware yet, users can communicate (back and forth) through secure UHF hard-copy messages with the new TCT system. Message buffer space is unlimited using a 386 laptop computer.

The Army provided heavy, difficult to erect, log-periodic antennas with the original TCT package. The electronic maintenance platoon created a better antenna. The company ordered omni-directional UHF antennas for every TCT in the corps. Today, instead of launching a five-section mast and precisely orienting the antenna, TCT holders merely mount the omni-antennas to something as simple as a camouflage support pole.

Conclusion

Our unit successfully fielded the IGRV through the use of numerous tactical innovations and the Army crawl-walk-run training philosophy. As a result, we hit the top of our band of excellence in a 100-day period that ended with the III Corps Warfighter.

CPT Corneau is Commander, B Company, 15th MI Battalion, 504th MI Brigade.

Viewpoint:

An Open Letter to MI Lieutenants

by Lieutenant Colonel
John D. Frketic

In the past few years, the MI Branch at Personnel Command has published some excellent newsletters for officers. However, in the past year I've heard MI lieutenants remark that branch has "told me I must do such and such...." Frankly, the reemergence of the "ticket punching" syndrome I thought we had stamped out disturbs me.

I have served as G2, 6th Infantry Division (Light), and Commander, 501st MI Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). I have always tried to guide MI lieutenants on a career path that best suits their individual desires, matched to the Army's needs. I'd like to share some things with all our lieutenants that I've learned along my path as an officer.

First, I understand your anxiety. The Army drawdown causes us to take a hard look at ourselves and where we fit in and rank among our peers. Unfortunately, a systematic drawdown seems to create a zero-defect mentality. Young officers think that every OER must be perfect. They subscribe to the theory: "I must do every job available or I won't be competitive for retention and promotion." Neither is true.

The three qualities I value most in junior leaders are enthusiasm, energy, and common sense. If you have enthusiasm and energy, you're going to make things happen, some good and some not so good. With a strong measure of common sense mixed in, you won't do many things wrong. Remember, as a young officer, enthusiasm makes up for knowledge and experience. Also, your company and battalion commanders have most likely walked in your boots and understand what you're going through.

Second, there are very few perfect individuals or performance records out there in the "real

Army." I have not held every job the personnel system says is necessary, and my performance in everything I've done hasn't been perfect either. On the other hand, I've done my best in every position I've held. Because of this, I've gravitated to more demanding positions.

This is what senior officers look for from you—at least 100 percent of your focus all the time. I've had officers decide that it was more important to attend their high school reunion than work long hours with their soldiers to correct an urgent problem. Or someone just had to get married in the middle of a major division command post exercise.

Don't take shortcuts. Give your soldiers the uncompromising leadership and care they deserve. Return to your superiors the loyalty they show to you. If you do this, chances are you'll progress through positions of increasing responsibility commensurate with your ability and desire.

Third, success as an officer comes primarily from your quantity of intelligence, physical aptitude, desire, and luck.

Intelligence. To succeed as an officer brilliance is not necessary, but you must have a certain amount of basic intelligence. A few officers may have finished at the bottom of their college class (yes, I know about General George Armstrong Custer and Admiral "Bull" Halsey). However, from what I've seen, these are the exception, not the rule.

You must have the intelligence to understand the concepts involved in strategy, operations, and tactics. Chances are, if you have a four-year degree from an accredited college or university, you fit the mold.

Physical Aptitude. Make no mistake; ours is a physical profession, especially the tactical Army. Few MI lieutenants have to "break track" or "hump" artillery rounds. However, you will lead soldiers in ways that require

physical expertise, stamina, and toughness. Combat, deployments, and field exercises will physically tax you. You must maintain a high degree of physical fitness. This enables you to accomplish the mission to the highest standard, over extended time and under harsh conditions. Nothing else matters.

Desire. To a certain extent, intelligence and physical aptitude are inherent. While we can improve on inherent abilities, there are limits. Desire is different. You must want to be the best you can possibly be with a deep personal desire and drive for excellence. This characteristic will overcome all hardships.

It reminds me of Thomas Edison's famous saying: "Genius is 10 percent inspiration, and 90 percent perspiration." Sometimes I think success as an officer is much the same. You really must want success (while still taking care of your soldiers and helping your peers).


Luck. Frankly, a bit of luck doesn't hurt. As a company commander at Fort Bragg, my battalion commander told me that good officers make their own luck. This is true. However, I've noticed that things just seem to happen to some people. (However, it's important to have a healthy measure of the other attributes to go along with good luck.)

Finally, very little of what I've written is original thought. Over the years I've worked for some outstanding officers who taught me a great deal. I've also read similar articles (some of them in MIPB) and spent a lot of time thinking about the art of "officer-ship."

We work in a thrilling profession that offers rewards and incredible heartbreaks. If you really want success, give it everything you've got. Don't take shortcuts, then you will succeed. **GOOD LUCK!**

LTC Frketic is Commander, Officer Training Battalion, 111th MI Brigade.

Technical Intelligence Goes to Kuwait



by Captain David L. Spencer

Combat commanders do not want any surprises during battle. This includes equipment or capabilities they didn't know the enemy possessed. Battlefield technical intelligence (TECHINT) prevents surprises.

Foreign Materiel Intelligence Battalion

The Foreign Materiel Intelligence Battalion (FMIB), an echelon above corps battalion, is part of the 513th MI Power Projection Brigade. The battalion has the worldwide mission to conduct battlefield assessment and initial exploitation of foreign equipment. The FMIB, located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, is the only Active Component tactical TECHINT unit in DOD.

Two Reserve Component TECHINT companies—the 372d and 383d MI Companies of the 94th Army Reserve Command—provide most of the Army's TECHINT capability.

During military operations, the battalion—

- ☐ Sets up the Joint Captured Materiel Equipment Center (JCMEC). Sister services and other DOD agencies augment the JCMEC.
- ☐ Deploys TECHINT teams to support deployed corps or equivalent combat forces.
- ☐ Sends liaison officers to operations centers of deployed units and to CONUS-based

Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) agencies.

The national S&TI community further evaluates and exploits foreign equipment.

TECHINT Teams

A TECHINT team consists of soldiers with analytical expertise in intelligence, tracked and wheeled vehicles, missiles, helicopters, armaments, electronic warfare, communications-electronics, combat engineer equipment, air defense systems, medical materiel, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) materiel. **FM 34-54, Battlefield Technical Intelligence**, establishes Army doctrine for TECHINT operations.

The Army attaches TECHINT teams to a corps or equivalent force (such as a Marine Expeditionary Force or a peacekeeping force). The team sends TECHINT data to the national S&TI community and to the supported commander. The commander can immediately implement all countermeasures the TECHINT community suggests to help combat forces defeat the enemy.

A Training Deployment

From 9 to 30 January 1994, two battlefield TECHINT teams deployed to Kuwait. They trained on captured Iraqi equipment. The

TECHINT detachment included one team from the FMIB and one from the Reserve 372d MI Company (TI), 94th Army Reserve Command, Hanscom AFB, MA.

In Kuwait, crews continued to recover vehicles and equipment. Crews must clear vehicles and the surrounding area of munitions, mines, and booby traps. The crew then takes the vehicles to a collection site or graveyard. Our TECHINT detachment observed equipment at various sites in and around Kuwait City. Two Kuwaiti officers accompanied the TECHINT detachment throughout the deployment.

The TECHINT detachment found it a challenge to train at the equipment sites. It identified numerous types and variants of equipment, and analyzed modifications and battle damage. We examined and identified over 1,900 vehicles from 13 different countries.

Equipment categories included tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, NBC, and recovery vehicles. The detachment even examined some U.S. equipment. We inventoried and identified—

- ☐ The former Soviet Union: T-55, T-62, and T-72 tanks; BMP-1, MTLB, BTR-50, BTR-60, BRDM-2, BMD APCs; and 2S1, 2S3, D30, D20, M46, and 2A36 artillery.
- ☐ Chinese: YW531, YW701, YW750 APCs ; type 59 and


(Continued on page 48)

Plugged In

Making Your Computer Work For You



YOU CAN'T "CIRCLE X" A DEADLINED COMPUTER



by Captain Gregory J. Conti

August 1990: The lieutenant felt like an idiot carrying his laptop computer along with his M-16 onto the plane. The division was deploying to a probable war with Iraq, and he had to sling a computer over his shoulder.

The major made him handcarry the computer instead of sending it on the ship with the rest of the equipment. The lieutenant didn't think the unit would need the computer before the equipment arrived. He was wrong!

Today's military must perform force projection. As an intelligence officer you could deploy to any number of hot spots around the world. When you go, you will take the tools of the trade—maps, 100-mile-an-hour tape, acetate, alcohol markers, and a computer.

You will use your computer to write operations orders and collection plans and for telecommunications. Your computer, in conjunction with a printer, enables you to reproduce and disseminate

information. It is absolutely critical to your mission. Although you may have the basic wartime supplies, do you have—

- ☐ The specific supplies needed to service your computer under wartime conditions?
- ☐ A preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) plan to keep your computer working under field conditions?

- ☐ Common repair parts?
- ☐ Adequate inventory to last approximately 30 days during heavy field use?

Check your on-hand inventory of these items now, before you deploy.

Printers

The first thing you'll need is printer ribbons and paper. During Desert Shield, the 24th Infantry Division's Special Security Office communications center went through a carton of printer paper and a ribbon every three days. We kept spare ribbons in zip-lock bags so they didn't dry out.

With the increased use of laser printers and copy machines, you must keep spare toner cartridges on hand. Also, bring a spare printer cable. This \$10 part will render your computer virtually useless if it is lost, broken, or stolen. Try to get a heavy-duty printer and a light-duty battery-powered printer to give you flexibility under all conditions.

Power

A shared unit generator will probably power your computer. Try to get a small AC generator just for your shop. You will need extension cables to carry the power from the generator and surge suppressors to filter the power. A power strip will give you the multiple outlets you need for your equipment.

You will also need three-to-two-prong adapters for extra flexibility. A Traveler's Power Adapter Kit is worth its weight in gold in many overseas locations. An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) will provide power if your generator fails, thus saving your work.

A spare battery for your laptop computer will act as a UPS and allow you to run for hours without AC power. Bring an extra power cable (laptop and desktop) and power supply (laptop). You cannot operate without these critical parts.

Communication

You may not use your computer for communications now, but if deployed, you will. Your computer must have a modem—a FAX-modem if possible. With a modem, you can connect into the phone system and send documents and FAXs around your local area and back to home station.

Bring the extra phone cables your modem will require. They only cost about a dollar, but if broken, will shut down your telecommunications. Bring along a spool of standard issue communications wire to tie into the phone system.

Preventive Maintenance

Follow these basic rules to

maintain your computer.

- ☐ Keep your computer covered and inside shelter.
- ☐ Make covers for your computers, either store-bought or home-made from trash bags and duct tape.
- ☐ Use covers only when the equipment is off. (The cover blocks the ventilation holes and overheats the machine.)
- ☐ Always transport a laptop in its carrying case.
- ☐ Get a computer cleaning kit, and clean the screen, case, and disk drive regularly. Carry a can of compressed air to "dust off" the inside and outside of your system. You can purchase this at any computer store in a travel size.
- ☐ Bring small screwdrivers, pliers, wire strippers, and electrical tape to make field expedient connections and repairs.
- ☐ Install a good anti-virus pro-

gram to protect your system. Bring an extra copy on a write-protected disk.

Computer diskettes can fail quickly in the field. One piece of dirt inside a disk will ruin it. Keep spare disks inside zip-lock bags. Hard drives are less prone to failure because they are sealed, but you must still treat them gently. You can ruin all of your programs and data if you treat them roughly.

Backups

You must backup your information. Keep at least one spare set of disks that contain your programs and DOS. Put them in a plastic bag and keep them in a safe place. Make daily copies of important documents and data. To make this process easier, try to get a tape backup drive, or if your hard drive is removable, get a spare.

Bring a large supply of floppy

disks. You will need them to disseminate information and make backup copies. If you have space, take your DOS and program manuals so you can troubleshoot easier.

Conclusion

Your computer is a great tool for your section. It can double your effectiveness, but it must be kept in sound working order. Develop a combat load of supplies. When you train, implement a system of backups and maintenance. With proper care, you can always count on your computer when you need it.

CPT Conti is assigned to the National Systems Development Program, 743d MI Battalion, Fort Meade, MD. He is a West Point graduate with a bachelor's degree in computer science. His E-Mail address is CONTI@ACM.ORG (75260, 1350 on Compuserve).

TECHINT

(Continued from page 46)

- ☐ 69-II tanks; and type 59, 59-1, and 83 artillery.
- ☐ British: a Ferret Scout Car, a Chieftain tank.
- ☐ French: various Panhard and AMX-10 APCs.
- ☐ Egyptian: a Fahd APC.
- ☐ Brazilian: an Engessa EE11 APC.
- ☐ South African: a G5 155mm gun.
- ☐ United States: M113, M109, 203 mm towed howitzers, and a Sherman tank.

The primary training challenge for the TECHINT detachment was identifying models, types, and variants. Severely damaged vehicles were almost impossible to identify. Many were severely burned or were little more than hunks of twisted metal.

We used automatic data processing and E-Mail to pass information from Kuwait back to the FMIB on telephone lines. We used the Chroma digital imaging camera to send back pictures of

pieces of equipment. This vital communications link enables TECHINT teams to disseminate information worldwide, and CONUS-based analysts to request further pictures or reports.

Team members visited equipment sites and exchanged information with elements of the Kuwaiti land forces. Engineer TECHINT analysts visited the Kuwaiti Military Ordnance Disposal unit to observe mine breaching equipment.

The detachment also toured the Kuwait Armor School. TECHINT analysts drove the M84, a Yugoslavian-produced tank the Kuwaitis use. They also observed cut-aways of the engine, hull, and turret the armor school uses to train tank crews and mechanics.

Lessons Learned

TECHINT analysts observed upgrade packages, either from various countries or locally produced, that significantly increased the capabilities of an old weapon system (considered obsolete).

For instance, a T-55 with a new gun, laser range finder, new engine, additional communications equipment, or additional armor still looks like a T-55 from the outside. However, it is significantly more lethal than the original T-55.

Every nation knows that it is cheaper to expand their capabilities by upgrading existing equipment, rather than buying new systems.

TECHINT identifies, assesses, and exploits technological innovations and modifications to foreign military equipment. TECHINT analysts can tell commanders what weapons and equipment they can expect to encounter and how to employ effective countermeasures.

Captain Spencer is Commander, 11th MI Company (TECHINT). Previous assignments include assistant S3 for the FMIB, company fire support officer, platoon fire direction officer, and battalion S2 for 5-41 FA Battalion, 3d ID.

The "Deuce" 50th Anniversary Ball

The 902d MI Group proudly invites all of its past officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, civilians, and any other interested former and current members of the Intelligence community to attend the "Deuce" 50th Anniversary Ball. We will hold it on 19 November 1994, at the BWI Marriott Hotel in Baltimore, MD.

The "Deuce" has a proud, patriotic, and professional heritage which began with its activation as the 902d Counterintelligence Corps Detachment on 23 November 1944, at Hollandia, New Guinea, in the Southwest Pacific.

Anyone interested in attending the 902d MI Group 50th Anniversary Ball can write to Commander, MI Battalion (CI)(S), ATTN: IAGPA-B-01 (CPT Stromberg), Fort Meade, MD 20755; or call 301-677-7885 or DSN 923-7885.

If former friends of the "Deuce" cannot personally attend, but have historical artifacts, photos, anecdotes, or other memorabilia which they would like to share donate, or loan to the group for the anniversary, we would welcome their contribution.

Come help us celebrate 50 years of "Strength through Vigilance."

HUMINT

(Continued from page 13)

a time delay or temporarily shutting down the system.

Despite these challenges, we parsed some significant reports directly into the ASAS correlated data base. This accomplishment set the stage for future success.

III Corps Warfighter

During the III Corps Warfighter, we attempted an advanced and reliable method of automating our HUMINT reports. We trained a soldier on FORSCOM Automated Intelligence Support System (FAISS) Workstation Baseline Software (FWBS) version 3.01. The newly acquired FWBS (or FAISS) provided a more efficient way to parse HUMINT reports. We used a coaxial cable to connect the FWBS to a packet switch network at the Small Extension Node (SEN).

Packet switching is a data transmission method where data is broken down into packets. The SEN transmits the packets by a dedicated data line (not a voice line) over one or more nodes (depending on which is either available or most efficient). The result is an almost instantaneous transfer of information to a distant station.

The transmission is not restricted to a single voice MSE line (such as the UGC-144). This process makes the packet switch network more reliable for data

transfer.

Using the KSALUTE format, we transmitted our interrogation reports directly to the ACE's collateral enclave (CE). The CE accepts collateral products and disseminates analyzed intelligence to major subordinate commands throughout the division or corps. The CE also used the packet switch network.

The CE quickly forwarded the reports by hard-wire connection through the CCS. ASAS parsed these reports into the all-source correlated data base which is designed to accept and graphically display the composition and disposition of enemy forces.

We also downloaded current intelligence summaries from the CE data base report files through the packet switch connection to the CE. ASAS incorporated enemy unit designations and locations from other sources into the CE data base report files. This critical information allowed us to update interrogators and CI agents as needed rather than waiting for an intelligence summary every 12 hours.

Goals

The goals of the 163d MI Battalion are to—

- ☐ File transfer the CE enemy situation graphics directly to our FWBS.
- ☐ Display the graphics on our monitors in the interrogation and CI operations sections.

- ☐ Print a copy of the graphics for dissemination to interrogators and CI teams.

We took a significant step in automating HUMINT reports, but cannot always reduce the information to a SALUTE format. KSALUTE interrogation reports do not include source reliability which is a vital ingredient. Additionally, CI personnel use reports that only other CI personnel may view. These, of course, cannot be entered into an all-source data base.

The entire HUMINT community must address these challenges as priority tasks.

Future of ASAS and HUMINT Automation

We must work harder to automate HUMINT reports. ASAS Fielding Block 1 focused on targeting. Block 2 includes the Single-Source Processor—HUMINT. This addition should refine HUMINT reporting.

Until then, interrogation and CI units must continue to improve the automation of their intelligence products. Units must provide their lessons learned to the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and the Joint Program Office to incorporate them into doctrine and automation development.

CPT Gonzalez is Commander, A Company (Interrogation/CI), 163d MI Battalion (TE). He has served as S2, 1-67 Armor Battalion, 2d Armored Division.

PROPOSER NOTES



Officer Notes

MI company grade officers perform some of the toughest and most diverse jobs in the Army today. Often, the diversity of intelligence assignments leads to confusion about professional development, career management, and branch qualification. Whether assigned to an echelons corps and below (ECB) or echelons above corps (EAC) unit, three principles remain constant:

- ☐ Take care of soldiers.
- ☐ Focus on the warfighter.
- ☐ Learn the Intelligence Battle-field Operating System.

DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization (Draft), outlines the minimum requirements for branch qualification as an MI captain:

- ☐ A bachelor's degree.
- ☐ At least 24 months in troop assignments.
- ☐ If branch detailed, successful completion of the MI Officer Transition Course.
- ☐ Successful completion of MIOAC and CAS³.
- ☐ At least 12 months at the tactical level (ECB).
- ☐ At least 36 months in any MI (35) coded, captain-level or higher duty position.
- ☐ Proficiency in captain and MI Military Qualification Specialty II tasks.

As the Army gets smaller, the key to success is strong duty performance coupled with branch qualification. We need, and our soldiers deserve, technically and tactically proficient officers to lead our branch into the next century.

CMF 98 and Warrant Officer Notes

The proponent briefed the Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca and the Commander,

Intelligence and Security Command separately on Career Management Field (CMF) 98 and related Warrant Officer 98 MOSs. These briefings resulted in several CMF 98 and signals intelligence (SIGINT) warrant officer restructure agreements.

MOS 98D Emitter Locator/Identifier and 98H Morse Interceptor will merge to form a single MOS—98H Morse Interceptor/Locator. This MOS will also perform the specific printer collection missions currently associated with "Keelan" positions. We have convened a Critical Task Site Selection Board for the "new" MOS 98H. The Critical Task List will assist our decision on transitional training requirements and methods.

MOS 98J Noncommunications Interceptor/Analyst and MOS 98K Non-Morse Interceptor/Analyst will not merge.

MOS 98C SIGINT Analyst or 98G Voice Interceptor will not change.

Warrant officer MOS 352D Emitter Location/Identification Technician and 352H Morse Interceptor Technician will merge into a single MOS—352H Morse Interceptor Technician.

We are trying to decide how to train current MOS 352D/352H warrant officers and the 98D/98H enlisted personnel in their new tasks. Preliminary analysis shows that individual units must conduct much of the transitional training. We realize that this will burden the units. However, budget constraints limit our ability to bring soldiers to Huachuca for training. We are exploring proposals to help in transitional training, including:

- ☐ Exportable training materials.
- ☐ Mobile training teams.
- ☐ Train-the-trainer courses.

The proponent will request that

the Army incorporate these proposals into AR 611-201, **Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties**, and AR 611-12, **Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialties**. We will request the changes during the December 1994 Military Occupational Classification Structure Cycle 2 target date window. POC for warrant officer issues is CW4 Platt, DSN 821-1183 or 602-533-1183. POC for CMF 98 issues is MSG Sames or SFC McIntyre, DSN 821-1450/1451 or 602-533-1450/1451.

Language

The DCSINT and the DCSOPS have changed the Language Indicator Codes (LICs) used for Spanish and Arabic dialect requirements.

Before the change, we coded Spanish linguist authorizations with three LICs:

- ☐ LA-Spanish American.
- ☐ QB-Spanish.
- ☐ SR-Spanish Castilian.

We coded Arabic linguist authorizations with nine LICs: AE-Arabic Egyptian, AD-Modern Standard Arabic, AP-Arabic Syrian, DG-Arabic Iraqi (Gulf dialect), AN-Arabic Saudi, AL-Arabic Libyan, AM-Arabic Maghrebi, AQ-Arabic Lebanese, and AC-Arabic Amharic.

All of these LICs are now obsolete. The LIC for the Spanish language is QB, in all dialects. The LIC for the Arabic language is AD, in all dialects.

DLI training. Most MI personnel who fill Spanish and Arabic linguist authorizations train at the Defense Language Institute (DLI). Although Spanish linguist authorizations exist for three LICs, DLI teaches only one Spanish basic course. However, basic Arabic language training is different. The DLI has three Arabic courses:

Arabic Syrian, Egyptian, and Gulf dialect.

DLI conducts 63 weeks of Modern Standard Arabic which include 120 hours of instruction in 1 of these 3 dialects. Arabic dialect is taught during the 3d semester, in the 47th week. It consists of two hours of dialect training per day, each day for 12 weeks. Instructors devote the last five weeks of the Arabic courses to Modern Standard Arabic.

DLI graduates from these courses are not Arabic Syrian, Egyptian, or Arabic Gulf dialect linguists. They are good Modern Standard Arabic linguists with an introduction to one of these three dialects.

MI Linguist AIT. When cryptologic and human intelligence linguists complete their DLI training, they attend MI Advanced Individual Training (AIT). AIT teaches

them the military application of their foreign language skills. Because AIT instructors teach so many blocks of 98G instruction in the foreign language, there are separate 98G AITs for each target language. Although DLI familiarizes these 98G Arabic trainees with one of the three Arabic dialects, all trainees attend the same 98G Arabic AIT. The 97E AIT is not as language-intensive as the 98G AIT.

There is little basis for coding documents with multiple LICs for Spanish and Arabic. This doesn't mean the Army doesn't care about dialects. It simply means that MACOM and unit trainers need to adjust their Command Language Programs by expanding dialect training as necessary.

MOS 97L Update. In previous Proponent Notes, we reported on the development stages of MOS

97L, a Reserve Component Translator/Interpreter MOS. This summer, we successfully conducted three two-week 97L transition courses in Spanish, German, and Japanese. We offered the courses to National Guard linguists who scored 2-2 in reading and listening in the requisite foreign language on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT).

Next summer, we will offer 97L transition courses again. To qualify, you must—

- ☐ Be enlisted.
- ☐ Be in a valid MOS (not necessarily an MI MOS).
- ☐ Have a 2-2 DLPT score.

Upon graduation, soldiers will receive MOS 97L as their primary MOS; their former MOS will become their secondary MOS.

CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

Making Doctrine and Making It Better

by Sergeant First Class
Michael C. Taylor

On 24 May, TRADOC's Deputy Commanding General, Combined Arms Command, approved FM 34-1, **Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Operations** as Army doctrine. MI professionals at the Intelligence Center and throughout the Army collectively revised FM 34-1.

TRADOC recognizes FM 34-1 as a sound doctrinal framework for force projection intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW). The field manual's success illustrates the critical role MI soldiers, at all levels, must play in developing MI doctrine.

Structure

The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca is the Army proponent which develops IEW doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Within the Intelligence Center, the Doctrine and Publications Division is the IEW doctrinal proponent. The division consists of the—

- ☐ Doctrinal Literature Branch.
- ☐ Production Branch.
- ☐ Training Material Support Branch (TMSB).
- ☐ Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB).

Doctrinal Literature Branch develops IEW doctrine and TTP. The branch has three writing teams. Authorization for each team is a captain, warrant officer, senior noncommissioned officer, and a civilian training specialist.

The Production Branch supports the writing teams through their editors, visual information specialists, illustrators, and word processing specialists. TMSB provides support through printers and warehouse personnel.

The development of IEW doctrine and TTP normally follows an 18-month production cycle. It be-

gins with a request for a prerevision review. Users in the field get the opportunity to review the manual and submit their comments to the authors. The production cycle ends when the branch ships the Camera Ready Copy (CRC) to Fort Eustis, VA, for printing.

During the production cycle the writing team develops—

- ☐ A purpose, scope, and target audience statement.
- ☐ A topic sentence outline.
- ☐ A preliminary draft for Intelligence Center review.
- ☐ An initial draft for Armywide coordination and review.
- ☐ A final draft for the approval authority's review.
- ☐ A final approved draft incorporating changes the approval authority directs or other TRADOC centers request.

At each stage of development, the writing team integrates recommendations from the field and further refines the content.

FM 34-1

For FM 34-1, the production cycle began in July 1992 and ended in July 1994. In those two years, two sets of authors wrote and rewrote FM 34-1 several times. Their mandate was to capture the thrust of FM 100-5, Operations, and the Intelligence Branch Operational Concept (IBOC).

Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., then Commanding General, Intelligence Center, guided this effort. The initial draft of FM 34-1 defined and described the "Intelligence System of Systems," and how it supports the warfighter's decision making process.

The team made significant changes to subsequent drafts in response to—

- ☐ Recommendations from the field.
- ☐ Publication of the initial draft of FM 100-5.
- ☐ Reassignment of both sets of authors.
- ☐ The arrival of Major General John F. Stewart, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center.

Between August 1993 and July 1994, we revised and restructured the initial draft to incorporate force projection IEW principles. The restructure process centered around the primary IEW tenet of FM 100-5: "The commander drives the intelligence effort."

Field Support

In January 1994, the authors provided the revised final draft to senior MI leaders and selected MI units Armywide. Their comments contributed to the quality and accuracy of the draft manual. The following list includes some of the individuals and units that contributed to FM 34-1:

- ☐ INSCOM helped shape the EAC and joint intelligence discussion.
- ☐ The 10th Mountain Division intelligence staff commented on their experiences in Somalia and Florida (Hurricane Andrew). This input enhanced

the "Operations Other Than War" and "Joint Intelligence" chapters.

- ☐ Colonel Ewing, G2, I Corps, reemphasized the danger of automating the targeting process and the importance of basic intelligence skills and procedures.
- ☐ DTOCSE Chief, Major Harley, 4th Infantry Division, added much to the manual's accuracy and clarity.
- ☐ Lieutenant Colonel Phillips, Commander, 104th MI Battalion, suggested that we use only four characteristics of effective intelligence—timely, relevant, accurate, predictive (TRAP).
- ☐ MI professionals, ranging from the Army DCSINT, Lieutenant General Ira C. Owens, to members of the 312th MI Battalion, helped shape IEW doctrine through their valuable comments and suggestions.

Final Review

Major General John F. Stewart, Jr., and a panel of colonels from the Intelligence Center reviewed the revised manual in March 1994. After we incorporated final guidance from the commanding general, the branch sent the final revised draft of FM 34-1 to Lieutenant General Miller and all TRADOC centers for review and comment.

The Infantry School, Armor Center, Field Artillery Center, JFK Special Warfare Center, Air Defense Center, and Sergeants Major Academy, to name just a few, made recommendations and supported our efforts to produce as good of a product as we could.

On 24 May 1994, Lieutenant General Miller approved the publication of FM 34-1—once we made minor fixes. We finished our work and mailed the CRC to ATSC, Fort Eustis, VA, on 13 July 1994. You can request copies through pinpoint distribution.

To Improve Doctrine

We must continue to improve the quality of MI doctrine and

TTP. One way to do this is to read and use doctrinal manuals. Obviously, many leaders and soldiers do not use MI doctrine. Their reasons range from "I've never seen the manuals" to "the doctrine is wrong."

The first excuse—no access to manuals—is either a leadership, training, or supply problem beyond the scope of this article.

The second excuse—the doctrine is wrong—strikes at the heart of what makes doctrine work. Obviously, many people write, review, and comment on the doctrine before we incorporate it into our manuals. We do not create doctrine in a void; it is not written by a lone MI "guru." We all contribute to the quality of the manuals that support our profession.

If something in doctrine is incorrect or outdated, send a recommended change to the address in the Preface of each field manual. When your unit has the opportunity to review a draft manual, carefully read it, and send your comments in by the suspense date. The authors read and evaluate all your comments and, if appropriate, incorporate them into the manuals.

Take advantage of MIPB to voice your opinion. Use your professional journal as a vehicle to bring doctrinal and TTP issues to the attention of the MI community.

Conclusion

I wrote this article to describe the time and work that go into each doctrinal and TTP manual the Intelligence Center and other TRADOC centers produce. More important, it shows how comments from the field ensure we write relevant, valid, and usable doctrine.

Without your comments and recommendations, MI doctrine is just another book gathering dust on the back of your bookshelf.

SFC Taylor is NCOIC, Doctrine and Publications Division, and the primary author of FM 34-1.

TOTAL FORCE



by Colonel John Craig

MI Battlefield Simulation Center and the RC

The MI Battlefield Simulation Center is the new name for the G2 Workstation. Many consider it the premier intelligence training exercise for the preparation of MI elements to support their units at—

- ☐ A corps or division Warfighter.
- ☐ A National Training Center rotation.
- ☐ A Joint Readiness Training Center rotation.

The Active Component (AC) MI force regularly participates in MI Battlefield Simulation Center exercises run by the MI Proponent. However, the resource requirements to send 75 soldiers TDY to Huachuca limits Reserve Component's (RC) participation.

A recent initiative moved the exercise, first to an AC location and now to an RC site. This is particularly significant to RC MI units that can now afford to use the MI Battlefield Simulation Center. The Northeast Regional Training Site-Intelligence, Fort Dix, already conducted several exercises for the ARNG and USAR. There are RC sites in other regions with the connectivity and secure facilities necessary to host the "front-end" of the MI Battlefield Simulation Center.

The exercise is flexible. Partici-

pants can mold and focus it to answer varied scenarios at many echelons. RC participants unanimously appreciate the utility of the remoted MI Battlefield Simulation Center.

As with most exercises, units must thoroughly plan and prepare for the exercise to ensure they realize its full potential. Start early and maintain contact with your Intelligence Center POC, First Lieutenant Uhlmann, MI Battlefield Simulation Center, DSN 821-4611/13 or 602-533-4611/13.

Training Reminder

As you prepare to send soldiers to training, please ensure they meet the physical and academic criteria. The school will not enroll soldiers who do not meet the prerequisites. Of particular concern are soldiers attending MOSQ 96B; effective 1 October 1993, the security clearance requirement is increased to Top Secret with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information. This change applies to all RC soldiers, initial active duty for training, and active duty for training. We continue to receive soldiers who do not meet this prerequisite; the school immediately sends them back to their home station. This wastes money, time, and training allocations in an increasingly austere environment.

safely concealed him. Artillery fires suppressed the enemy.

The effective use of Stinger teams protected the task force from enemy close air support. Electronic attack and electronic warfare support protected the task force from enemy indirect fires. A-10s destroyed the enemy reserve before he could counter-attack as the task force rolled-up

Officer Course Prerequisites

DA PAM 351-20, Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), outlines the criteria for the RC MIOBC and RC MI officer transition course. Students must complete ACCP Phase I before attending the two-week resident Phase II in each course. The student must thoroughly understand Phase I material to successfully complete Phase II.

Instructors give resident Phase II students a diagnostic test when they arrive. They base the test largely on ACCP Phase I material. Soldiers who fail the test must take remedial training and a retest on non-duty time. Both of these courses are rigorous with long hours. Prepare yourself; complete Phase I.

The RC chain of command to the MACOM level must endorse any requests for waivers before the school considers them.

POC for these courses is Captain Tom Bergfeld, Intelligence Center staff officer, DSN 821-2085 or 602-533-2085.

COL John Craig is Chief, Reserve Forces Office. LTC Dave Miner is ARNG Advisor. Their numbers are DSN 821-1176/77 or 602-533-1176/77. FAX is DSN 821-1762 or 602-533-1762.

OPORD

(Continued from page 36)
in the R&S plan and attend the rehearsal.

Summary

The lead tank in the task force approached the breach site. The successful use of smoke on the breach (due to favorable winds and a temperature inversion)

the enemy position. The S2 had anticipated all the enemy's actions, and thus ensured the brigade's security.

And that's just the way it should be.

CPT Cleaves is an MI company team trainer at the NTC. He was the S2 of an aviation battalion and an infantry brigade and commanded an MI company.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 4)

dence to support his assertions that "our government has little concern about (U.S. Forces Korea soldiers') survival" or that "our government considers Korea a vacation spot."

President Clinton has reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty both publicly and privately (as have all previous U.S. presidents since 1953). A majority of congress and the American people support him in this commitment. Even as the State Department continues to seek a peaceful solution to the Korean problem in Geneva and New York, the Department of Defense, U.S. Army, and the Combined Forces Command in Korea are quietly but energetically taking all necessary steps to ensure that we will prevail in the "worst case." Those measures which SFC Johnson calls for to protect U.S. soldiers are in fact being planned.

The role of U.S. soldiers as a "trip wire" in harm's way does not imply a policy that considers them "canon fodder." On the contrary, such a demonstration of resolve has served as an effective and credible deterrent to the North Korean threat for 41 years. SFC Johnson may have considered himself a "speed bump" and expected to die in place during his service in Korea. However, many personal conversations on numerous occasions (most recently in July 1994) with soldiers, NCOs, and officers of the 2d Infantry Division and other U.S. Forces Korea units lead me to conclude that his is a minority view. I would also add that soldiering is a dirty, dangerous business that often requires great courage, sacrifice and risk of death; it is not for those who cannot make that commitment.

One last comment: like SFC Johnson, I, too, have "paid my dues." I began my adult life as a soldier in the 1st Cavalry Division back in the days when the Cav stood on the DMZ astride the primary avenue of approach into the

ROK. That experience plus a combat tour with the infantry in Vietnam have given me intimate familiarity and empathy for soldiers placed in harm's way. SFC Johnson is wrong; I am neither "too far removed" nor "unconcerned" about soldiers in Korea.

Homer T. Hodge
Alexandria, VA

To the Editor:

LTC Robert E. Hallagan's article, "Concepts: Army Intelligence Support to JTF Operations" (July-September 1994), contained a glaring error. The Army's counterintelligence (CI) functions are already integrated into joint warfighting, but not through consolidation.

I believe LTC Hallagan confused the Foreign Intelligence Activity (FIA), a human intelligence (HUMINT) organization, with the Foreign CI Activity (FCA). FCA would be very surprised to find out it is only just now being created, since it has been around, in one form or another, since at least 1974 (it was named FCA in 1985). Its worldwide mission is offensive CI operations and CI investigations. It is not (and not slated to become) the only CI element in the Army, and does not have exclusive CI responsibility in any theater.

Army CI is not being incorporated into the Defense HUMINT Service, as the paragraph implied. Service CI elements require no modification to support joint warfighters, other than learning to work with a Joint Task Force CI Coordinating Authority (see **Joint Pub 2-01.2, CI Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Operations**, 5 April 1994).

With so many changes underway in the Intelligence Community and the Army, inaccuracy can start rumors that demoralize our folks. If I were a CI agent in the 205th MI Brigade, V Corps, reading LTC Hallagan's article, I would be wondering if there will be a slot for me in the future. Please, writers, verify the accuracy of your

statements on future organizations, if only for the mental well-being of your readers.

Regan K. Smith
Springfield, VA

To the Editor:

I have read with interest the debate in your pages concerning the applicability of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process during Operation Garden Plot (Los Angeles riots). Not only do I agree with Major Womack that an MCOO and other IPB products could have been produced but also as the 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light) S2 NCOIC, I can state that they were produced.

The 2d Brigade was the active duty Army element deployed to L.A., along with elements of the division headquarters acting as the joint task force command. The two issues I will address here are the types of products and processes that were developed, and the ability of the S2 to maintain a data base on gang activity.

Upon establishing our brigade command post at El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, we began working on an array of products with an eye toward predicting possible future hot spots. Using street maps, information gathered from law enforcement, our knowledge of past riots, and common sense, we developed an overlay showing possible locations of future rioting. With the exception of Parker Center (Los Angeles Police Department headquarters), riot locations were based on the availability of economic targets and the number of liquor outlets in the area.

Top priorities for looting included shopping centers, sporting goods stores, pawn shops, and Korean-owned businesses. Additionally, the more liquor outlets in an area, the greater the potential for rioting. The worst of the initial rioting occurred at the corner of Florence and Normandy, right in front of, and fueled by, a liquor store.

Two products that helped answer the SLOW GO/NO GO question were an ethnicity overlay and a gang affiliation overlay. Gangs in L.A. are racially monolithic and highly turf conscious. It was unlikely that a gang would cross the invisible racial/gang boundaries that divide many of our major cities.

As a bonus, the ethnicity overlay helped in allocating linguistic resources during both our deployment and the city's recovery phase. Besides English and Spanish, L.A. has sizeable Korean, Vietnamese, and Armenian speaking populations. In other major U.S. cities, you'll find enclaves of people who speak Arabic, Russian, Polish, Italian, Chinese, and Creole, to name just a few. The location of ethnic neighborhoods can be invaluable information for the commander.

None of these products or others we worked on were as fully developed as we wanted. However, IPB is not simply a means to a product end. As Major Womack quoted, the new draft FM 34-130, **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, emphasizes that IPB's value is in the process itself.

Finally, we should put to rest the notion that developing a data base on gang activity while deployed would violate the prohibition against the military collecting intelligence on U.S. citizens. It is not illegal to develop gang profiles, coordinate with local officials for force protection, or record and pass suspicious activity in your area of operations.

Some files that are permissible while deployed in a civil disturbance situation must be destroyed when the unit redeploys to garrison, but that should not

prevent their initial use. The Judge Advocate General (JAG) is the subject matter expert on what can and cannot be done in these situations. Close cooperation between the JAG and the S2 is essential to ensure that needed information is kept, without violating the law.

As the MI community heads into the next century, ever-changing missions demand adaptability. From civil disturbances to disaster relief, from peacekeeping to peacemaking, from the Korean peninsula to northern Iraq, we need to be able to respond quickly to the commander's intelligence needs. The IPB process remains the primary tool to accomplish our mission.

SSG Todd A. Voter
Camp Zama, Japan

Olmsted Scholarship Program

The 1995 George and Carol Olmsted Scholarship Program provides a unique and valuable opportunity to officers who meet its rigid selection criteria. Awardees and their families become part of a foreign culture while the officer attends a university in the host nation. Officers and their families reside in the local community and speak only the native language.

Officers selected as Olmsted Scholars attend the Defense Language Institute (DLI) for 6 to 12 months, depending on the host-nation language. Following DLI, the officer will attend in-country language training for three to four months before the officer attends a foreign university for two years.

Olmsted Scholars are not obligated to serve utilization assignments. This allows the officer to return to troops or attend the Command and Staff College, depending on professional development requirements.

Eligibility criteria follow:

- ☐ Captain between 3 and 11 years of commissioned service as of 1 April 1995.
- ☐ Branch qualified.
- ☐ Minimum Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 89.
- ☐ Graduate Record Examination score of 1150.
- ☐ Minimum Grade Point Average of 3.5.

Officers must receive branch permission to compete and must comply with **AR 621-7, Acceptance of Fellowships, Scholarships, or Grants**.

The Personnel Command will convene a selection board on 23 January 1995 to select seven candidates for the Olmsted Foundation. On 15 April 1995, the board will select three Olmsted Scholars.

Officers who want to apply for this scholarship should contact their assignment officer.

PROFESSIONAL READER

MIPB needs you to support the book review program. We publish book reviews on selected new books relating to military intelligence, military history, and some foreign relations.

MIPB receives book reviews from authors who participate in our book review program and authors who procure the book themselves. These reviews serve a valuable purpose; to educate our readership.

Some publishers provide MIPB with

review copies of their new books. MIPB encourages anyone interested in our book review program to contact us for a current list. Reviewers can then keep any book they review free.

A book review of approximately two double-spaced typed pages is adequate. Please include the title, author, publisher, publisher's address, year published, number of pages, and price in every book review. Every book review should answer four questions:

1. Is the book worthwhile?
2. What is the book about?
3. How good or bad is the book?
4. What benefit does the MI professional receive from reading the book?

If you find a worthwhile book not on our book review program list, feel free to review it for us and contact us about the book. We can then try to have the publisher add us to their mailing list.

If you have any questions, call us at DSN 879-0797 or Commercial 602-538-0797, or write to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

A History of Warfare by John Keegan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 432 pages, \$28.

In 1976, John Keegan, Britain's leading military historian, wrote *The Face of Battle*, a study of the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. In it, Keegan had documented the sights and sounds of combat as no one had done before. His latest book, *A History of Warfare*, is a breathtaking adventure through the history of humanity.

Throughout the book, Keegan attacks German military strategist and philosopher Karl von Clausewitz's work *On War* and his mistranslated, but snappy, assertion that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." Keegan maintains that Clausewitz failed to consider that cultural and social factors, as well as politics, influence warfare. He blames Clausewitz for influencing the savagery of 20th century world wars.

The book sketches the history of warfare beginning with "War in History," followed by "Stone," "Flesh," "Iron," and "Fire." He bridges these eras with chapters on "The Limitations of Warmaking, Fortification, Armies, and Logistics and Supply." In "War in History," Keegan demonstrates the influence of anthropology on the character of war. "Stone" deals with primitive warfare, while "Flesh" reflects on the role of horses in Eurasian battle. Greek, Roman, and medieval war are elements of "Iron." Finally, "Fire" addresses the role of gunpowder and the impact of technology.

As in *The Face of Battle*, Keegan gives examples of the landscape and challenges that armies face. He cites the fact that it took a Roman legion 67 days to march from Rome to Cologne. He says the British fired a million shells in a week before the World War I battle of Somme, compared to only 25,000 fired against Napoleon at Waterloo.

Keegan persuasively explains that the history of the world is a history of warfare. Keegan provides keen insights into the ferocity of the Aztecs, Easter Islanders, Zulus, Mamelukes, and Japanese samurai. He tells of the decisive strategy of the Huns, the Ottoman Turks, and the Mongols.

Keegan asserts that we should discard the Clausewitzian theory that war is an extension of politics for the primitive model of "restraint, diplomacy and negotiation." He envisions future warriors fighting against "ethnic bigots, regional warlords, ideological intransigents, common pillagers, and organized international criminals."

Some may disagree with Keegan's division of warfare by eras. Nevertheless, in 432 pages, the author weaves a rich history of the character of peoples, strategy, tactics, weapons, and war.

LTC Richard F. Riccardelli
Carlisle Barracks, PA

Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941-1945 by Carl Boyd (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 270 pages, \$25.

With *Hitler's Japanese Confidant*, Dr. Carl Boyd, a history professor at Old Do-

minion University, makes a valuable contribution to the history of American signals intelligence (SIGINT). It is a fascinating account of how American code breakers developed a single source in one of our most important sources of strategic intelligence during World War II. Readable and superbly researched, intelligence professionals will find this book informative and illuminating.

From 1941 to 1945, General Oshima Hiroshi was the Japanese ambassador to Hitler. Pro-Nazi and advocate of a Japanese-German alliance, Oshima built an excellent rapport with Hitler, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany's foreign minister, and other high-level German leaders. With this ringside seat to German decision making, he sent thousands of coded messages to Tokyo. Besides simply reporting what he saw and heard, Oshima gave informed assessments of German intentions and outlook.

Fortunately for the Allies, the American Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) was able to tap into this rich source of information. Between the world wars, a small group of American cryptanalysts made inroads into the Japanese codes. In the mid-1930s, they read Japanese diplomatic messages. In 1940, they solved, after a herculean effort, the famous PURPLE code. Under the code name MAGIC, this progress allowed the Americans to read most of the traffic between Oshima and Tokyo. Oshima became, as General George Marshall stated, "the main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe."

Relying on translations of over 2,000 of Oshima's original messages, Boyd describes how the Japanese ambassador supplied the Allies with information on German plans at the highest level. Through Oshima, the Americans gained insights into the strengths, capabilities, and motives of the German-Japanese alliance. In addition, his reports to Tokyo gave valuable operational intelligence on German plans during the campaigns in North Africa and Northwestern Europe. This included detailed information on German defense disposition at the Atlantic coast before D-Day.

Oshima was "at his best" describing the German-Soviet war. He provided the Americans with vast amounts of information on that decisive front—information that wasn't forthcoming from our Soviet allies. The ambassador's intercepted messages yielded so much intelligence that Boyd writes: "One shudders to estimate what the cost in time and human life would have been lost were it not for the Oshima connection and MAGIC."

Boyd occasionally overstates the importance of Oshima's reports while discounting other intelligence sources. However, his book illuminates the dynamics of collection, analysis, and exploitation of strategic SIGINT. He describes the difficulties of distributing critical MAGIC intelligence without revealing its source. This problem was especially acute when American decision makers traveled overseas. Boyd also shows how American cryptanalysts had to deal with garbled transmissions, Oshima's biases, and a tendency to depend too much on Oshima's reports.

Filling a gap in our knowledge of World War II strategic intelligence, *Hitler's Japanese Confidant* is an ex-

cellent study of SIGINT and the information it can provide.

CPT Michael Bigelow
Fort Monroe, VA

Intelligence and the Mirror on Creating an Enemy by Robert B. Bathurst (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), 131 pages, \$20.

Bathurst had a very good idea: to study the cross-cultural differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and to explain how these differences dictated intelligence analysis between these two Cold War rivals for almost 50 years.

Unfortunately Bathurst, a former U.S. Navy Captain who specialized in Soviet intelligence, loses his way and his readers in a thicket of "folkways," "anger chains," and "fabulations." What is decipherable in the work is Bathurst's thesis that the two Cold Warriors didn't really understand each other. You don't say?

Bathurst bolsters this "bombshell" with examples of differences in each culture and further discusses how each interprets the world differently. According to Bathurst, Soviet (or Russian) thought is synchronic, in which many things must be considered at one time. This leads to shades of subtlety that affect language, negotiation, and strategy.

American thought, by contrast, is diachronic—moving in sequence. This basic difference in the ways the players think about themselves, their environment, and each other is evident in each player's actions over the past half century. Bathurst cites as an example the disastrous 1986 summit meeting at Reykjavik between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Negotiations broke down between the two leaders over the high-context problem of strategic nuclear weapons and disarmament.


While the Soviets defined "strategic" as essentially all nuclear weapons, the United States viewed "strategic" as only those weapons that could be classed as "intercontinental."

Bathurst continually subjects his readers to complex psychological jargon that distracts and detracts from his thesis. There are a few high points worthy of mention, specifically Bathurst's discussion of the alcohol problem that plagues Russian society and its effect on the highest levels of political and military leadership. Bathurst cites how little U.S. spymasters understood or knew about the pernicious effect alcohol had on the Soviet politico-military elite.

Also noteworthy is his cogent analysis of the failure of American intelligence to predict the rise of Boris Yeltsin, who was viewed by Americans as an undesirable national leader even though his leadership profile was well-suited for Russian political life. Regrettably Bathurst's best moments are too sparse to save the book. Instead of a tightly woven study of two intelligence giants and their perceptions of each other, Bathurst loses us on a twisting, bewildering journey through a maze of psycho-jargon that sheds little light on this important and under-researched area of the Cold War.

MAJ Jack Thomas Tomarchio, USAR
Wayne, PA

201st MI Brigade



The black background denotes covert operations. The disc and the pole star symbolize the unit's broad capabilities. The wavy bars allude to its World War II Pacific campaigns. Mountain peaks represent Korean campaigns. The Sergeant Griffin signifies excellence, MI's eagle eye, and a lion's strength and courage. Lightning flashes denote communications, EW capabilities, and its signal connection. The sword means protection and danger.

The 201st MI Brigade carries the history and heritage of two separate units: HHC, 503d ASA Group and the 201st MI Detachment. The Army constituted and activated HHC, 503d ASA Group as the 323d Signal Company Wing in 1942. The company supported the Army Air Force in World War II, and was inactivated in 1946.

Between September 1950 and May 1956, the Army redesignated the company several times. The Army inactivated it in June 1959 and relieved it from assignment to Second U.S. Army.

The Army constituted and activated the 201st MI Detachment in July 1944 as the 201st CI Corps Detachment. The detachment participated in World War II and Korean War campaigns. Between March 1956 and June 1975, the Army redesignated the detachment many times.

The HHC lineage, 503d ASA Group and 201st MI Detachment merged on 1 September 1987. The Army removed HHC, 503d ASA Group from the Army Reserve and allotted it to the Regular Army. The 503d consolidated with the 201st MI Detachment and the Army redesignated and reactivated the unit as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), 201st MI Brigade.

The brigade participated in four Pacific Theater campaigns in World War II and nine Korean War campaigns. Unit decorations include two Meritorious Unit Commendations and a Philippine Presidential Unit Citation.

As of September 1991, the 201st MI Brigade became a total force brigade with five battalions and two companies. HHD, 14th MI Battalion (TE) and 502d MI Battalion are assigned to the brigade; the 29th Signal Battalion is attached. Reserve and National Guard component units are 307th MI Company, F/425th Infantry Company, 373d MI Battalion (TE), and 641st MI Battalion (AE).


The 201st MI Brigade's mission is to provide all-source intelligence to I Corps. The brigade plans, coordinates, integrates, and directs brigade assets in response to I Corps intelligence requirements. The brigade also provides EW and OPSEC support to the I Corps commander. Finally, it provides the vision to modernize the force by testing and evaluating new equipment.

The brigade operates with the "warrior spirit." The 201st requires each soldier to be physically tough and mentally alert to accomplish the mission. The brigade is dedicated to the whole soldier concept—individual, unit, and family.

For the 201st MI Brigade, the most important goal is combat readiness. When a unit follows the goals of training, maintenance, care of soldiers, and planning, they reach the highest state of readiness.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence Center & Fort Huachuca
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Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

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